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ABOUT THE GICHD AND THE PROJECT
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is an expert 
organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster munitions and other 
explosive hazards, in close partnership with states, the UN and other human security 
actors. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 55 staff 
from over 15 countries with unique expertise and knowledge. Our work is made 
possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 
20 governments and organisations.
Motivated by its strategic goal to improve human security and equipped with subject 
expertise in explosive hazards, the GICHD launched a research project to characterise 
explosive weapons. The GICHD perceives the debate on explosive weapons in 
populated areas (EWIPA) as an important humanitarian issue. The aim of this research 
into explosive weapons characteristics and their immediate, destructive effects on 
humans and structures, is to help inform the ongoing discussions on EWIPA, intended 
to reduce harm to civilians. The intention of the research is not to discuss the moral, 
political or legal implications of using explosive weapon systems in populated areas, 
but to examine their characteristics, effects and use from a technical perspective.
The research project started in January 2015 and was guided and advised by a group 
of 18 international experts dealing with weapons-related research and practitioners 
who address the implications of explosive weapons in the humanitarian, policy, 
advocacy and legal fields. This report and its annexes integrate the research efforts 
of the characterisation of explosive weapons (CEW) project in 2015-2016 and make 
reference to key information sources in this domain.
The content of this publication, its presentation and the designations employed do not imply 
the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) regarding the legal status of any country, territory or armed 
group, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All content remains the 
sole responsibility of the GICHD.
Cover image: an explosion during an airstrike on Kobane, Syria, as seen from the Turkish side of the border, 
near Suruc district, 13 October 2014, Turkey, Syria
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
States, the United Nations and civil society organisations continue to raise 
concerns about the humanitarian impact caused by the use of explosive weapons 
in populated areas (EWIPA). This issue is currently being examined from political, 
legal, socio-economic and humanitarian perspectives. The GICHD has undertaken 
research to provide a technical perspective on the destructive effects of selected 
explosive weapons to inform the international debate.
The research project attempts to reduce an observed knowledge gap regarding 
EWIPA. It seeks to provide clarity concerning the immediate physical effects and 
terminology used when discussing explosive weapons. The project is guided by 
a group of experts dealing with weapons-related research and practitioners who 
address the implications of explosive weapons in humanitarian, policy, advocacy 
and legal fields.
Explosive weapons are generally designed specifically to kill and injure human 
beings and to destroy or otherwise incapacitate 1 vehicles and infrastructure. 
Whilst they carry out similar functions when used in populated areas as when 
they are employed elsewhere, the impact of their use may differ. Indeed, the use 
of explosive weapons in populated areas has resulted in significant civilian deaths 
and injuries. In addition to the human cost, our case studies confirm substantial 
damage to essential infrastructure, homes and businesses.
The research focuses on the inherent technical characteristics of the explosive 
weapon systems studied and their use in populated areas, examining both the 
methods and means of warfare. It draws on five technical studies on explosive 
weapon systems, each of which assesses a common type of weapon system 
present in contemporary conflict zones. The weaponry covered was chosen on the 
basis of its ubiquity, notoriety, widespread stockpiling and use in populated areas. 
The five weapon systems reviewed are 122 mm multi barrel rocket launchers, 
81-120 mm mortars, 152-155 mm artillery guns, 115-125 mm tank guns and the 
Mk 82 aircraft bomb. The research’s findings focus on the effects of the explosive 
munitions; inherent accuracy and precision of the five weapon systems employing 
them; and on their characteristic use including methods to mitigate the impact 
on civilians.
1 Including neutralise, suppress or harass the adversary, especially when used for indirect fire.
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Effects of high explosive munitions in populated areas
The Mk 82 aircraft bomb and 122 mm rockets were found to have the widest area 
effect, although mortar and artillery projectiles were both responsible for single-
munition explosions resulting in double-figure casualties. Of the weapons covered 
in the study, tank munitions were often found to have a more limited lethal area 
than others. Whilst there are measures the user can take to adjust the effects 
of an explosive weapon in terms of the way it functions, many systems such 
as multi barrel rocket launchers produce design-dependent effects intended to 
cause widespread destruction.
The effects of high explosive munitions within populated areas are influenced 
substantially by the presence of built structures and geographical features. 
Vehicles, housing, commercial property, factories, schools, hospitals, etc. may 
provide some protection from primary 2 and secondary 3 explosive weapon effects, 
but also amplify these due to the channelling and reflection of blast waves. 
Buildings and vehicles contribute bricks, concrete, glass and other debris to the 
fragmentation originating from the weapon. Any fuel sources or toxic chemicals 
within the munition’s impact zone may pose a further deadly hazard to humans, 
as does the compromised structural stability of buildings which may be prone 
to collapse.
The intuitive reflex among humans to seek shelter from an explosive weapon 
attack in buildings, vehicles, narrow streets, tunnels and similar enclosed or semi-
enclosed spaces poses a lethal risk. Besides the reflecting blast waves in such 
spaces, the intensification of the weapon effects occurs due to the presence of a 
large number of people and structures within the effective range of a munition(s), 
as well as sources of secondary fragmentation. This results in a higher proportion 
of fatalities than would be likely in open spaces.
Humans are particularly vulnerable to blast overpressure and reflected blast 
waves. Surviving an explosive weapon attack with only surface bruises visible 
does not exclude ruptured eardrums, damaged lungs, internal bleeding, brain 
damage, infections and poisoning, and bone fracturing. Depending on the layout 
2 Effects originating from the detonating munition i.e. blast overpressure, fragmentation, heat 
and light.
3 Effects originating from the objects affected by the detonation: secondary fragmentation, 
debris (i.e. pieces of masonry, plumbing, glass, wood, metal, bone fragments, etc.), firebrands, 
ground shock and cratering. See page 59.
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of structures in a populated area and type of explosive weapon used in an attack, 
the probability of survival for a human may increase when away from the proximity 
of structures (prone on the ground in a small depression or narrow ditch).
Inherent accuracy and precision of the studied weapon systems
The accuracy and precision (See Accuracy and precision, p. 25) of the explosive 
weapon systems reviewed differ significantly, with tank guns and guided aircraft 
bombs being capable of use in an accurate and precise direct fire function when 
certain conditions are met. Artillery gun and mortar systems are capable of a 
relatively high level of accuracy in an indirect fire function. However, due to the 
lower precision inherent in their design, projectiles are typically spread over a wide 
area which increases with the distance to the target. Unguided artillery rockets 
are generally neither accurate nor precise.
The level of accuracy and precision can be unpredictable and inconsistent with 
any of the weapon systems studied, owing to factors such as the level of operator 
training, alignment and sighting of the weapon, the quality control of munitions, 
weapon maintenance and the practical experience of the firer in using the weapon 
in varying terrain and weather conditions. Most indirect fire systems used in 
conflicts of today are incapable of achieving the high degree of accuracy required 
to hit a small point target with the first round.
Characteristic use of explosive weapons and measures to control 
their impact
There are measures the user can take to adjust the wide area effects of explosive 
weapons. Competent target analysis and approval procedure, positive target 
identification, evaluation of the immediate physical environment and the selection 
of the most accurate and precise weapon available to the user are key factors in 
reducing collateral harm. If the impact of explosive weapons on civilian life and 
infrastructure is to be minimised, the decision on the method of employment 4 
and timing of the attack, including the choice of optimal munition type and fuze 
configuration, will further assist in mitigating wide area effects.
As a general rule, armed forces should have thorough knowledge of the dynamic 
effects of the munitions in their inventories and should be able to predict fairly 
4 i.e. direct, indirect or air-delivered fire method; selected based on a number of variables 
including access and physical proximity to the target, geography, weather, available weapon 
systems and collateral damage considerations.
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accurately the extent of these effects in open terrain. However, there is less 
awareness of the effects of use in built-up areas. This is especially the case with 
regard to the impact of rebounding blast and sources of secondary fragmentation 
and debris. Whilst some militaries have the capability to model these hazards, this 
is far from common and carries limitations in terms of its ability to mimic reality 
accurately.
Observing the devastation in the majority of cases studied where explosive 
weapons were used in populated areas, it appears that the critical assessments 
of the probable damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure prior to their use 
was inadequate or recommendations generated by such assessments were not 
followed, resulting in substantial collateral damage.
Still, the use and acquisition of munitions may be changing in response to the 
challenges of using EWIPA. One example is the lesser use of Mk 84 (907 kg) 
aircraft bomb in contemporary conflict and the development of new, smaller 
bombs equipped with precision guidance systems such as the Very Low Collateral 
Damage Weapon (BLU-129/B, 227 kg) and Small Diameter Bomb (BLU-39, 110 kg). 
These developments imply increasing awareness of the substantial area effects 
of explosive weapons and may also suggest a gradual change in military doctrine 
concerning good tactical use of air-launched weapons, testifying to attempts 
better to control and reduce wide area effects by providing more appropriate tools 
in support of targeting policies (see Weapon-target matching, p. 65).
The key findings of the research project are presented in the section Findings and 
conclusion and exemplified in Effects analysis, with further evidence and examples 
in the five explosive weapon studies (Annexes A to E).
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INTRODUCTION
This report attempts to characterise five explosive weapon systems: what they are, 
what they do, and how they are being used in populated areas, focusing on the 
analysis of key factors contributing to their effects on delivery. It is part of a project 
involving a series of studies that analyse the destructive effects of five commonly 
used explosive weapon systems. These are: the BM-21 122 mm multi barrel rocket 
launcher (MBRL); 152 mm and 155 mm artillery guns; 81 mm and 82 mm medium 
mortars and 120 mm heavy mortars; 115 mm, 120 mm and 125 mm tank guns; 
and the guided and unguided variants of the Mk 82 aircraft bomb.
After a brief overview of explosive weapon systems, their accuracy and precision 
qualities will be presented. The key terms and descriptions in the context will 
be introduced and the relevant concepts and modes of application. Thereafter, 
the various effects of detonating high explosive munitions, both on humans and 
structures will be examined, again with clarification of the technical language 
on the topic. These first sections of the report are to equip and familiarise the 
reader with the above concepts and terminology, so as to benefit fully from an 
increasingly technical analysis.
The report goes on to observe the contemporary use of explosive weapons, with 
emphasis on targeting practices and activities pertaining to the choice of a weapon 
and munition appropriate to the target, including fuze configuration. After this 
section, the five explosive weapon systems are presented and characterised from 
the perspectives of accuracy and precision, particular munitions’ effects, and their 
typical role(s) in contemporary conflict. A technical comparison is made on the lethality 
of the munitions fired by each of these systems, and patterns of use are reviewed.
In the following analysis, findings are extracted from tens of case studies examining 
the actual use of each of the studied explosive weapon systems in conflicts around 
the world. Annexes A through E 5 of the report provide more detailed information 
about the weapon systems, common high explosive munitions employed, as well 
as presenting case studies 6 of their use in populated areas.
5 Annex A: 122 mm BM-21 MBRL, Annex B: 152 mm & 155 mm artillery guns,  
Annex C: 81–120 mm mortars, Annex D: 115–125 mm tank guns, Annex E: Mk 82 aircraft bomb.
6 Case studies are referred to throughout this report with an alphanumeric designation, for 
example, D3 refers to Case Study 3 in Annex D: 115-125 mm tank guns.
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Amid the significant challenges of measuring the overall extent of the wide area 
effects of high explosive munitions, the report draws conclusions from the 
findings of the case studies, and findings pertinent to the inherent characteristics, 
combination of effects and representative use of the studied explosive weapon 
systems. Attention is retained on the constituents of the various effects and the 
effects’ interaction with each other, contributing to the impact on civilians. The 
research limits its considerations to the immediate effects of an attack involving 
these weapons and their munitions, rather than long-term consequences.
One of the goals of this report is to identify any knowledge gaps likely to have 
humanitarian consequences. The results should support efforts by policymakers, 
the drafters of military doctrine and the international community to better 
understand the ramifications of using explosive weapons in populated areas and 
encourage further research on their specific effects and targeting practices in 
these environments. The report and accompanying weapon studies can also be 
used to assist in more accurate recording of and reporting on the use and effects 
of explosive weapons.
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METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE
The characterisation of explosive weapons (CEW) project is managed and 
implemented by the GICHD, and guided by a group of 18 experts from disciplines 
relevant to researching the effects of explosive weapons in populated areas. 
The experts volunteered to be consulted on a pro bono basis and shared their 
knowledge in a personal professional capacity. They come from specialised and 
international organisations 7 dealing with weapons-related research and include 
practitioners who address the implications of explosive weapons in humanitarian, 
policy, advocacy and legal fields.
This research was further supported by the Geneva Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies (IHEID). As part of the IHEID’s Applied 
Research Seminar, three Masters students were seconded to carry out literature 
research on weapon effects, and map incidents of use of the selected weapon 
systems in conflict zones around the world. An independent consultant reviewed 
the case studies and provided five explosive weapon studies for the project, also 
directing the work of the students. The GICHD then engaged Armament Research 
Services (ARES), a specialist technical consultancy, to lend subject expertise and 
co-edit this report.
There are three phases to the CEW project, the first being to identify the scope 
of the research, establish stakeholders and partners, and assemble the group of 
subject experts. Once that was achieved, the GICHD, in close collaboration with 
the expert panel, determined the methodology and set the criteria for selection 
of the weapons to be studied. A list of terminology commonly used to describe 
EWIPA was mapped, compiled and clarified (see page 111).
This report marks the end of the second phase of the project, which involved 
technical research into five explosive weapon categories and the analysis of tens of 
case studies. The third and final phase of the project will use the raw data compiled 
by the project in a purpose-built computer simulation of explosive weapon effects 
7 In addition to the GICHD, these include: Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), Armament 
Research Services (ARES), Chatham House, Cranfield University, Fenix Insight Ltd., 
Fraunhofer-EMI, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), Insecurity Insight, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Small Arms Survey, Save the Children, UK, UN Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
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in populated areas. All phases of the research will apply the same methods when 
compiling, formatting and presenting data, thus enabling a valid comparison to be 
made of the effects of different weapons on humans and infrastructure.
The weapon systems examined were selected on the basis of their ubiquity and 
frequency of use in recent and current conflict and in populated settings, as well 
as the availability of case study data. Furthermore, this report focuses on high 
explosive (HE) munitions that continue to be used in conflict and which remain 
commercially available, or are currently stockpiled in many countries. Several 
advanced versions of these are referenced, but not discussed in depth due to 
their few appearances in modern conflict, a relatively small number of users and in 
some cases, lack of available data. Examples of these are various precision guided 
munitions for indirect fire systems such as artillery guns, rockets and mortars.
While most of these weapon systems are also capable of delivering munitions 
that do not rely on HE content for their primary effects – such as illumination, 
smoke, kinetic energy penetrator, less-lethal, nuclear, chemical, and biological 
munitions – these lie outside the scope of this report. The report also does not 
address cargo munitions, which dispense HE submunitions 8 or mines 9 as these 
have already been addressed consistently in the framework of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. It is important to 
distinguish between explosive munitions and incendiary munitions (see Overview 
of explosive weapon systems, p. 19); this report does not address the latter. 10
The case studies of each explosive weapon system included in this report were 
chosen to highlight their characteristics with an emphasis on the effects in a 
populated area. Many other case studies were undertaken, but the difficulty in 
obtaining reliable and accurate data from active conflicts and post-conflict areas 
meant that they did not meet the standards of this publication. The selection of 
the case studies was based on criteria of relevance, information verifiability and 
availability. While a representative selection was sought, the use of higher profile 
and publicly available examples were preferred.
8 AKA ‘cluster munitions’. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin, 30 May 2008, in force 
1 August 2010, 2688 UNTS 39.
9 See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices as amended on 3 May 1996, Geneva, in force 3 December 1998, 2048 UNTS 93; 
and Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997, in force 1 March 1999, 
2056 UNTS 211.
10 See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, 10 October 1980, 
in force 2 December 1983, 1342 UNTS 171.
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Not all of the desired information 11 was available for each case study, but the cross-
comparison of multiple studies helped the identification of gaps in understanding. 
This information was further analysed to create a comprehensive characterisation 
of the typical design-dependent effects of each weapon system’s use in a 
populated area.
Due to limitations on the types of conflict zones from which valid case studies 
could be drawn, there is a risk of unrepresentative sampling. The authors have 
done their utmost to abate this risk by examining the use of a particular explosive 
weapon in several conflict theatres and verifying the information from multiple 
sources.
This report does not seek to address the tertiary effects of explosive weapons 
use (i.e. reverberating, indirect and/or longer-term damage). 12 Instead, the focus 
remains on the primary and secondary effects of an attack. It is not the intention 
to discuss the moral or legal implications of using explosive weapon systems 
in populated areas, but to examine their effects from a technical perspective. 
Furthermore, this report does not seek to explain the development history, 
employment, sustainment and targeting of explosive weapon systems, although 
these are briefly addressed. 13
11 Case studies, designated by annex and number (e.g. A1), include the following data fields: 
date/time of attack; location; a map of the area with impact points; the weapon system 
examined; number of munitions employed; range the munition was delivered from; the impact 
area size or dispersion area of multiple munitions; casualties; infrastructure damage; other 
damage; distance from detonation; sources and any other remarks. 
12 For information on tertiary, or reverberating effects, see Wille & Borrie, 2016.
13 For information on these aspects, see Cross et al., 2016 and Dullum et al., 2016.
Use of terminology | 17
USE OF TERMINOLOGY
The characterisation process required in-depth research into the terminology 
used to describe explosive weapons, their various effects, and the environments 
in  which they are used. What does a populated area, a ‘town’ or a ‘village’ actually 
refer to? What should be considered an ‘explosive weapon’, and what is excluded 
from that definition? What is a ‘barrage’ of projectiles? How effectively to commu-
nicate ‘the various destructive effects’ of an explosive weapon?
In order to ensure consistency in the use of terminology, the research team 
compared recognised sources of literature regarding munitions and their use. 
These included the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Allied Administrative 
Publication No. 6); British Ministry of Defence and Defence Safety Authority 
Explosives Regulations (Joint Service Publication No. 482); International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (United Nations, 2nd Edition 2015), International Mine Action 
Standards (United Nations 2014) and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(Protocols I, IV and V and Amended Protocols II and III). Reports were consulted also 
from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Armament Research 
Services (ARES).
Terms that were found effective for the purposes of the characterisation activity 
were selected and are included in the Terminology of explosive weapons table at 
the end of this report. In some instances there was no suitable term available to 
accurately describe a particular subject pertinent to explosive weapons. To reduce 
uncertainty and for completeness therefore, some existing terms were amended 
and fresh descriptions were developed (see Terminology, p. 111).
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WEAPON SYSTEMS
20 | Overview of explosive weapon systems
‘Explosive weapon system’ is an informal term for any weapon system which 
delivers a munition with a primarily explosive payload. Explosive weapon systems 
differ substantially in their delivery mechanism, employment parameters and 
specific effects, but all use a munition to deliver an explosive payload to a target. 
The munition in question may be properly termed a bomb, rocket, missile or 
projectile, with some overlap or conflict between technical and lay terminology.
Explosive weapon systems have traditionally used munitions delivering signif-
icant quantities of high explosive compositions, commonly supplemented by 
fragmentation, to achieve a wide area effect. These munitions cause damage 
primarily via blast, fragmentation and thermal effects (see Effects of high explosive 
munitions, p. 41). Most explosive weapons are designed, developed and employed 
as area effect weapons, often fired at distance to achieve maximum effect 
against multiple targets. They may utilise either direct fire or indirect fire principles 
(see p. 30 and 35), depending on the system.
An important consideration in the design and use of explosive weapon systems is 
the need to ensure accuracy and precision 14 appropriate to the intended effects, to 
maximise the weapon’s efficiency and, increasingly, to minimise collateral damage. 
Historically, the difficulty of ensuring accurate and precise fire has led to doctrines 
which favour suppression of the enemy by overwhelming firepower. Explosive 
munitions used in such a way are commonly employed en masse 15 in salvo fire, 
and often in an indirect fire support role. The employment of explosive weapon 
systems in this manner within populated areas can put civilians and essential 
infrastructure at grave risk of harm.
In military terms, a ‘bomb’ is generally accepted to be a guided or unguided 
munition with no method of propulsion (such as an aerial bomb, or emplaced 
IED). A ‘projectile’ refers to a munition propelled under power from a weapon 
system, such as a gun. A ‘rocket’ is generally accepted to be an unguided munition 
propelled by a rocket engine, whilst a ‘missile’ is taken to mean any self-propelled 
guided munition. Guided munitions which employ rocket propulsion may be 
termed ‘guided missiles’; however, some missiles use forms of thrust other than 
rocket propulsion (Cross et al., 2016).
High explosive munitions are designed to destroy, damage, kill, injure or inca-
pacitate the intended target. Multiple considerations are weighed when 
developing munitions for a particular use. Piercing the armour of personnel, 
14 See ‘Accuracy and precision’ section in this report for description of these terms.
15 Several weapons firing a number of munitions simultaneously as a single group (in a mass, 
all together, as a group).
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vehicles or structures, for example, may require a particular casing and fuze in 
order to optimise the intended effects. Anti-personnel requirements in open terrain 
may call for primarily fragmentation effects, whereas in enclosed environments 
(such as buildings and vehicles) they may make airburst high explosive, or 
thermobaric 16 warheads, a more effective choice.
In addition to their intended effects, munitions are designed according to various 
other constraints, including their delivery system(s), their working environment, 
available technology and materials, cost and legal restrictions. The design of 
munitions delivering similar effects and developed under similar constraints will 
still vary by delivery system. For example, artillery gun projectiles will commonly 
feature a thick munition casing to withstand the extremely high acceleration during 
the firing process and to produce significant fragmentation effects. General-
purpose air-delivered bombs, by comparison, are only exposed to the airstream in 
the immediate vicinity of the delivery aircraft, and so do not require the structural 
rigidity of an artillery gun projectile. They will generally contain a higher proportion 
of explosive fill by weight (Cross et al., 2016).
Figure 1. Arrangement of a typical mortar projectile (source: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007).
Figure 2. Arrangement of a typical artillery rocket (source: Dullum, 2010).
16 i.e. enhanced blast.
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A high explosive munition is primarily intended to deliver a warhead 17 – a general 
term used to refer to the portion of a munition containing the payload 18. All 
warheads contain, at a minimum, a fuze, the explosive fill and the warhead case. 
The type of warhead has a significant influence on the destructive effects, as the 
design may increase, for example, the blast or fragmentation effects of a munition.
Several types of explosive warhead exist; however, this report is primarily 
concerned with those that are both commonly held by states and non-state actors, 
and have the most substantial impact when employed in populated areas. These 
are the high explosive (HE) and high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) types. 
Other warhead types which rely primarily on high explosive content to deliver 
their intended effects include high explosive anti-tank (HEAT), high explosive 
squash-head (HESH) 19, continuous rod; dense inert metal explosive (DIME); and 
the enhanced blast warheads – thermobaric and fuel-air explosive 20.
It is important to understand the distinction between incendiary and high explosive 
munitions. The former deflagrate, whilst the latter detonate. 21 The Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 22 defines an 
’incendiary weapon‘ as ‘any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set 
fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, 
or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered 
on the target’. Whilst explosive munitions often deliver a thermal effect, they are 
primarily intended to cause damage through blast and, typically, fragmentation.
Weapons may have both a ‘maximum range’, the farthest that a projectile will travel 
under optimal conditions, and an ‘effective range’. The definition of the latter tends 
to vary by user, but is generally considered to be the maximum distance at which 
a weapon may be expected to be accurate and achieve the desired effect (DoD, 
17 Term ‘warhead’ is typically associated with rockets and missiles; ‘shell’ with artillery and 
tanks guns; ‘bomb’ with mortars.
18 The distinction is blurred when referring to munitions with submunition payloads, or less-lethal 
or non-lethal payloads (Cross et al., 2016).
19 Known as high explosive plasticized or high explosive plastic (HEP) in the United States 
and elsewhere.
20 Thermobaric and fuel-air explosive munitions fall outside the scope of this report, but are 
increasingly employed by state and non-state actors in current and recent conflict zones. 
For information on these munitions, see Cross et al., 2016.
21 Note that some incendiary munitions may also contain high explosive bursting/anti-handling 
charges.
22 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol III.
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2016). The effective range should only be considered indicative. It varies with 
munition, training, sights used, whether the weapon platform is stable or mobile, 
weather conditions and other factors. The variations of these factors can contribute 
to civilian harm. For example, the Russian 115 mm 2A20 Molot tank gun fitted 
with the TSHS-41U telescopic sight and firing the 3OF18 HE-FRAG projectile has 
an effective range of 3000 m but its maximum range is 9500 m when fired at 
a gun angle of 16° (Nikolskiy, 1997). When used at night, firing with the TPN-1 
night sight, its effective range is reduced to 800 m for all projectile types. This 
is a limitation of the sight, not of the munition but which has an impact on the 
projectile’s effective range.
Finally, the introduction of precision guided munitions (PGM) and low-collateral 
damage weapons (see Acknowledging wide area effects, p. 94), particularly for 
air-delivered bombs, has substantially changed the way certain explosive weapon 
systems impact populated areas. The PGM are addressed in this report. PGM 
also exist for artillery gun and mortar projectiles, rockets (including those fired 
from MBRLs) and tank guns. These are not discussed in this report due to their 
rare appearance and employment in conflicts to date. PGM represent a marked 
difference in the employment criteria, effects and capabilities of explosive 
weapon systems. For those militaries with the ability to deploy such advanced 
technologies, PGM have led to substantial differences in the role of explosive 
weapon systems.
24
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Achieving a high degree of accuracy and precision in firing an explosive weapon 
is of utmost importance if the objective is to deliver its effects on a specific target 
and hit nothing but the target. Whereas there are particular distinctions between 
the weapon’s use in indirect and direct fire modes, in all situations, to hit a given 
target, the user must know the precise location (x,y) and elevation (z) of both the 
target and the weapon. Prior to firing the first round, the user must also be able to 
configure the weapon and the munition to correspond with the nature (size, type) 
of the target, and adjust variables pertinent to weather, distance and the weapon’s 
alignment, among other factors.
The terms ‘accuracy’ and ‘precision’ have two distinct meanings, often understood 
respectively as the ability to hit a desired target, and the ability to hit that target 
consistently. The difference between accuracy and precision can be usefully 
understood in relation to archery. If an archer wielding a bow is accurate, after firing 
several arrows the ‘grouping’ of impacts will be centred on the target. However, 
the arrows may be dispersed and some – or all – may not strike the centre of the 
target (Figure 3, example 3). If an archer is precise, the arrows will impact closer 
together, in a tight grouping. However, this may not necessarily be close to the 
centre of the target (Figure 3, example 2). A good archer will therefore be both 
accurate and precise, ensuring that each arrow impacts close to the centre of the 
target and forms a tight group (Figure 3, example 4). An imprecise and inaccurate 
archer will shoot a loose grouping not centred on the target (Figure 3, example 1).
Indirect fire weapon systems, however, are designed to have a natural dispersion 
to ensure that not all munitions strike the centre of the desired target 23 (Figure 3, 
example 5). In connection with explosive weapons therefore, accuracy refers 
Figure 3. Accuracy and precision as affected by systematic and random errors.  
The red circle represents the desired area of effect (source: ARES).
23 e.g. unguided rockets, artillery guns, mortars, unguided air bombs and any systems 
dispersing cluster munitions.
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to a weapon’s ability to strike a desired mean point of impact (MPI) 24, whereas 
precision is the measure of the standard deviation from the MPI, or ‘dispersion’.
One common measure of weapon system precision is known as Circular Error 
Probable (CEP). The calculations used to determine the CEP for a weapon system 
are complex and require substantial modelling, field-testing, and statistical analysis 
of the fall of shot data under known conditions. It can be approximated to the 
radius of a circle centred around the MPI, the boundary of which is expected to 
include the impact points of 50% of the munitions in question (Sheedy, 1988). In 
simple terms, this means that half of the munitions fired, launched or dropped 
at a target would fall within the CEP of the weapon system; 93.7% will fall within 
twice the CEP radius and 99.8% will fall within three times the CEP radius from 
the MPI (see Figure 4). 25 A larger CEP therefore denotes increased uncertainty as 
to the precision of the weapon system. 26
Figure 4. Error around the point of impact – Gaussian distribution and diagram of the 
Circular Error Probable (CEP) circular distribution (source: ARES).
24 Mean Point of Impact (MPI): the average impact position of a number of rounds (Dullum et al., 2016).
25 Figures given for CEP assume that munitions are deployed under standard testing circumstances, 
unless otherwise indicated.
26 The original concept of CEP was based on a circular bivariate normal distribution (CBN), with 
CEP as a parameter of the CBN, just as μ and σ are parameters of the normal distribution. 
Munitions with this distribution behaviour tend to cluster around the aim point, with the majority 
landing reasonably close together, then progressively fewer as the distance increases, and 
very few at long distance. That is, if CEP is n metres, 50% of rounds land within n metres of the 
target, 43.7% between n and 2n, and 6.1% between 2n and 3n metres. The proportion of rounds 
that land farther than three times the CEP from the target is around 0.2% (Cross et al., 2016).
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Many factors affect the accuracy and precision, such as the meteorological 
conditions at launch or along the ballistic trajectory, alignment and sighting of 
the weapon, or low standards in munitions manufacturing. In field applications 
munitions fired from the same system may have been manufactured in different 
factories – possibly even in different countries – leading to the potential for large 
variations in consistency and tolerance, which will introduce errors.
Systematic errors are consistent from round to round and affect accuracy, while 
random errors are unpredictable and affect precision (Taylor, 1997). Various features 
of different weapon systems may be designed to mitigate errors that affect precision 
or accuracy, or may contribute their own sources of error. 27 Precision guided 
munitions have a guidance system which allows course correction in-flight, enabling 
a target to be struck with a high level of precision and accuracy. They are designed 
to correct both systematic and random errors.
Systematic errors are consistent over a period of time and over multiple rounds. 
For example, an error in the estimation of the wind speed may result in a salvo’s 
MPI being located to the right of the target. Similarly, a given batch of munitions 
may be consistently underweight, resulting in impacts prior to the target area. 
Both of these would lower accuracy, or create bias 28, in the impact pattern. This 
bias can be adjusted against for subsequent firings – the main reason indirect fire 
is ‘walked’ on to a target.
Random errors are those which vary between munitions, or over very short periods 
of time between firing. Typically, random errors arise from poor quality control, 
or larger tolerances in the manufacturing process resulting in notable deviation 
between rounds. One source of random error is differences in the munitions’ 
weight 29, or using a different type or amount of propellant than has been calculated 
for. This creates a larger deviation in the impact pattern, resulting in a much wider 
dispersion of impact points.
As the weapons covered in this report are used widely around the world, the 
weapons and munitions have been manufactured in a variety of countries and at 
different times and environments. Each of these factors will result in weapons that 
differ from the original design to varying degrees, meaning that the systematic 
27 Each weapon system has sources of error that affect accuracy and precision differently, 
some quite particular to that system. Refer to Annexes A–E.
28 Bias is an error that only affects accuracy, resulting in a consistent offset in the MPI from 
the aim point or target.
29 Unless the difference is predictable, in which case it becomes a systematic error  
(Dullum et al., 2016).
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errors of each copy will be slightly different from the original. Poor tolerances, 
insufficient maintenance and general wear and tear resulting from training, 
transport and use, increase the random errors of a weapon or a batch of munitions.
The operational life of each type of barrel is measured by the number of 
rounds it can fire before the wear exceeds acceptable tolerances. Each time an 
artillery gun, mortar or tank gun is fired, it is worn down. Increased barrel wear 
results in increased ‘windage’: the difference in projectile and bore diameter. 
When projectiles no longer fit tightly into barrels, this will adversely affect their 
accuracy, precision and range. Barrel wear can vary between guns in a formation, 
introducing inaccuracy and imprecision when these are fired en masse.
Inadequately resourced militaries may struggle to maintain the weapon systems 
and munitions correctly and in a systematic manner. Weapons and munitions 
often remain in service for much longer than their recommended operational 
lives (ARES, n.d.).
Other factors that could affect accuracy and precision include the quality of the 
information available to the operators; their ability to incorporate that information 
into the firing parameters; position and alignment of the weapon; environmental 
(meteorological and other) conditions; and storage and transportation of the 
munitions; all of varying levels of importance depending on the weapon system 
in question and its operational use.
The training of the operators is instrumental in accounting for and mitigating these 
factors. For example, a poorly trained or untrained crew may mix different batches 
of otherwise consistent munitions, leading to an increase in error. For those 
militaries seeking to source munitions for older weapon systems, the challenge 
can be to find homogenous batches that have been correctly packed, stored and 
transported since manufacture. Munition fabrication for modern military weapon 
systems is usually standardised and subject to strict quality inspections, resulting 
in increased precision and accuracy, but batches are still subject to changes over 
time due to changing conditions in storage, handling and transport.
A neat circular distribution of munition impact locations is rarely exhibited in 
the field, particularly with longer-range indirect fire systems such as artillery 
guns and rocket artillery. Impact distributions will typically exhibit a larger 
standard deviation (or error) along the line of fire than across. This results in 
an elliptical confidence distribution. Circular, or elliptical, Error Probable is only 
relevant for considering the precision of a weapon; it is not an estimate of a 
weapon’s accuracy. However, for the purposes of discussing explosive weapon 
use in populated areas, it is an important characteristic for predicting potential 
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collateral damage. 30 Manufacturers, militaries, NGOs and other stakeholders use 
the term CEP frequently in reference to weapon systems.
The CEP figures provided by armed forces or, especially, manufacturers typically 
assume perfect firing conditions, and a well-trained and experienced crew using 
munitions that have been both stored correctly and used before the end of their 
serviceable life. These conditions are often not present in practice, particularly 
among inadequately resourced militaries and non-state actors. Sometimes 
manufacturers’ CEP figures are quoted but without details of the standard range 
at which the CEP is applicable, although in most cases with standard munitions 
the maximum range is used.
Measures of accuracy and precision can be notably degraded by adverse weather 
conditions. With indirect fire systems such as mortar, artillery gun and rocket 
systems, and unguided bombs, meteorological conditions such as wind and 
changes in prevailing air pressure 31 during the munition’s flight play a substantial 
role in determining accuracy and precision. The further the munition must travel, the 
more significantly errors (both systematic and random) will affect its deviation from 
the intended MPI. In order to compensate for the prevailing weather effects, current 
readings from meteorological systems 32 may be used to adjust sighting and firing 
parameters, altering the trajectory of the munition. Accuracy and precision can be 
further improved by using modern, computer-controlled firing systems, especially 
in conjunction with smart fuzes and PGMs (Dullum et al., 2016). However, the latter 
option is not available for many of the older systems used in conflict zones, nor 
accessible to most non-state actors and many armed forces.
INDIRECT FIRE WEAPON SYSTEMS
When discussing explosive weapons, it is important to differentiate between 
direct and indirect fire systems. Direct fire systems are employed when the 
target is within the line of sight, with the weapon aimed directly at the target. 
The munition’s trajectory closely follows the line of sight. Conversely, indirect fire 
weapon systems most commonly engage targets which are not within the direct 
30 Precision guided munitions follow the same statistical laws as unguided munitions, but their 
CEP is much smaller. PGM generally have more ‘close misses’, and do not follow a Gaussian 
(normal) distribution (Dullum et al., 2016). 
31 i.e. amount of air resistance, or drag, at different altitudes, and altering lift effect to the 
munition-in-flight. 
32 e.g. a weather balloon.
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line of sight. Yet, the term ‘indirect fire’ may also be used to describe fires delivered 
when the target is visible from the weapon system, but where the direct ‘vision 
link’ between the operator and target is not used for aiming (Ryan, 1982).
Indirect fire weapon systems include artillery guns, mortars, artillery rockets and 
many air-delivered munitions. Indirect fire may be employed to fire into defilade, 
out of defilade 33, or over forces or structures other than the target, in order to strike 
a target obscured by geographic or structural features, or by the curvature of the 
earth over long distances (see Figure 5).
Indirect fire weapon systems can be very accurate and quite precise under optimal 
conditions. However, adverse conditions, poor maintenance and inadequate 
training have a significant impact on the accuracy and precision of these systems. 
Over the long ranges that these weapon systems are typically employed, a slight 
deviation in accuracy can result in a complete miss. Adjusting fire procedures may 
be employed to account for random deviation in the impact location – to ‘walk’ 
the fire towards the target.
33 The protection of a position against enemy observation or gunfire: see Figure 5.
Figure 5. Comparative trajectories for indirect fire artillery systems (source: ARES / USAFAS).
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Indirect fire weapon systems examples
MBRL type systems are often significantly less accurate and precise than guns 
or mortars. As the 122 mm BM-21 MBRL was developed to be an area weapon, 
accuracy and precision are not its primary strengths. When the BM-21 launches 
multiple rockets, these are launched some 0.5 seconds apart. As the launcher 
is vehicle-mounted, each launch causes the vehicle suspension to compress 
and rebound. The suspension movement causes fluctuations to the angle of the 
launching tubes, and subsequently greater inaccuracies in the delivery of the 
rockets. This means that rockets launched later in the salvo are likely to be less 
precise than those launched at the beginning (Dullum et al., 2016). The significant 
differences in vehicle types, weights and launcher mounting methods observed 
between BM-21 copies and variants makes this error very difficult to assess across 
different systems. Error induced from this process may be particularly pronounced 
when MBRL systems are mounted to lightweight vehicles with soft-suspension, 
such as civilian 4 x 4 pickup trucks.
With rocket artillery, meteorological conditions play a more significant role in 
determining accuracy and precision than with most other weapon systems – for 
example, wind may contribute an error ratio of some 2% at ranges of 20 km 
(Dullum, 2010). This is the equivalent of an error of 400 m from the desired MPI at 
a range of 20 km. Rocket artillery is also affected by a number of errors that do not 
affect other explosive weapon systems, such as tip-off due to launcher motion, 
and transverse wind during the boost phase of the rocket (Dullum et al., 2016).
Due to these factors, as well as others beyond the scope of this report, rockets 
launched from an MBRL of a design such as the BM-21 will typically be among 
the least accurate or precise explosive weapon systems commonly employed.
An estimation of the accuracy of the BM-21 must account for both systematic 
and random errors, as the combination of both determines the effectiveness of 
a strike. It is clear that the longer the range, the greater the margin for error and, 
therefore, the greater the CEP and bias. For errors across the line of fire, this can 
be described as an angular deviation, proportional to range fired, usually expressed 
in mils 34; see Table 1 for typical figures.
34 ‘One mil is approximately equal to a milliradian, which is an angle spanning out one 
metre at a distance of 1000 m – there are 6400 mils in a circle. An error measured in mils 
can be converted to metres by multiplying the given error (in mils) by the firing distance 
(in kilometres).’ (Dullum et al., 2016).
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TABLE 1
 SAMPLE ACCURACY AND PRECISION FOR THE BM-21 GRAD
Accuracy and precision of selected multiple barrel rocket launchers (assumed values)
Values given as deviation in mils across x along the line of fire
System Firing distance 
(km)
Random error 
(mils)
Systematic 
error (mils)
Total error 
(mils) 35
122 mm BM-21 19 5.8 x 8.5 6.0 x 12.0 8.3 x 14.7
Source: Dullum, 2010.
When firing a 122 mm BM-21 rocket at a range of 20 km, for example, a sample 
probable error in deflection is 160 m, and a sample probable error in range is 
300 m, representing ideal conditions (see Figure 6).
35 Ibid.
Figure 6. Probable error for a 122 mm rocket fired from a BM-21 Grad at a range of 20 km 
(source: ARES). These figures have been overlaid on a real-world example of BM-21 CEP. 
The map shows select, verified impact locations and approximate scale of an MBRL attack 
in Mariupol, Ukraine on 24 Jan 2015 (source: Human Rights Watch, 2015).
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Artillery guns are generally considered to be a more accurate and precise indirect 
fire system compared to the studied mortars and rocket artillery, although the 
longer range of artillery systems (in comparison to the other systems examined) 
must also be taken into account. Artillery is still subject to errors induced by 
meteorological phenomena such as wind, and beyond a range of approximately 
15 km these factors are generally the largest source of error. The ability to mitigate 
meteorological error is dependent on the accuracy and comprehensiveness of 
the information available to the ballistics computer and upon the accuracy of the 
ballistics model.
Approximate CEP values for 155 mm artillery guns are given in Table 2, below. The 
U.S. M777 towed and M109A6 self-propelled artillery guns, for example, have a 
maximum CEP of approximately 140 m when fired at 25 km (Knudson, 2008). The 
U.S. Army has previously designated 267 m as an acceptable CEP, at the maximum 
range of its 155 mm weapon systems. Various CEP figures given for 155 mm guns 
at 30 km are over 260 m, with variance for specific models (Watts, 2013).
TABLE 2
 APPROXIMATE CEP VALUES FOR GENERIC 155 MM ARTILLERY GUNS
155 MM ARTILLERY ACCURACY
Range CEP
15 km 95 m
20 km 115 m
25 km 140 m
30 km 275 m
Source: Dullum, 2010; Hill, 2007.
NATO 120 mm HE mortar projectiles have a nominal CEP of approximately 136 m 
at their maximum range, without the use of an advanced fire-control system. The 
use of a fire-control system (such as the M95/M96 Mortar Fire-Control System 
(MFCS)) significantly reduces the CEP of conventional NATO 120 mm HE mortar 
projectiles (Super & Kundel, 2007). Improvements in the accuracy and precision 
for both medium and heavy mortars have been made, particularly in relation to 
the design of the munition.
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DIRECT FIRE WEAPON SYSTEMS
Direct fire systems are those employed with an unbroken line of sight between 
the weapon system and the target. Under ideal circumstances, direct fire systems 
are very accurate and precise, and may be capable of achieving first-round hits. 
However, hitting the intended target does not negate the possible wide area 
effects of the munition. Collateral damage in populated areas remains likely when 
the target is small and the explosive yield of the munition is high.
Direct fire weapon systems examples
Tank guns are a typical example of a direct fire system. Unguided bombs dropped 
from aircraft have historically required the use of bombardment techniques more 
in line with those used by indirect fire systems, but this has changed with the 
introduction of advanced targeting and precision guided bombs. Modern aircraft-
dropped bombs are employed in a manner that has more in common with tanks 
than artillery.
As tank guns are direct fire weapons, they do not suffer many of the difficulties 
inherent in indirect fire systems, and modern tank guns can be precise and accurate 
up to the maximum effective range of the gun. However, if a tank projectile misses 
its intended target, it is very likely to retain sufficient kinetic energy to continue for 
several kilometres beyond the target. Most tank guns can be fired from a moving 
platform, often whilst remaining accurate and precise, as the fire-control systems 
in modern tanks are able to measure a large number of different factors and 
adjust the aim accordingly. Modern tank fire-control systems measure, amongst 
other factors, the precise range to target, wind speed and direction, temperature, 
humidity, the angle of the target relative to the firing position, the angle of the 
ground, and the wear inside the barrel, in order to produce a very high first 
hit probability.
Under the guidance of a highly trained and competent crew, well-designed and 
well-built tank guns and munitions can have significant accuracy and precision. 
For example, a 120 mm Rheinmetall L55 gun is capable of landing five projectiles 
within an area measuring 9 cm high and 34 cm wide, from a distance of 2000 m 36 
(Rheinmetall, n.d.). While modern tank guns rely on advanced fire-control systems 
to achieve these results, older tank guns are commonly employed with only 
rudimentary equivalents. As such, the gulf in accuracy and precision between 
legacy tanks and tank guns and their modern counterparts is significant.
36 Firing the DM53 APFSDS round.
36 | Accuracy and precision
PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS
Precision guided munitions (PGM) are designed to strike a precise target with the 
first shot by altering their trajectory during flight. In addition to the warhead, PGM 
also carry a seeker head, a processor and typically a servomotor assembly, with 
which to control small wings that are used to guide the munition to the target. 37 
The CEP of modern PGM tends to be no greater than a few metres, even at their 
maximum range (Cross et al., 2016). While highly effective, the technology involved 
in producing PGM makes them very expensive to acquire, train with and employ. 
Precision guided projectiles may also employ rocket-assisted or base-bleed 38 
designs in order to increase their effective range. PGM offer enhanced first-round 
hit probability and reduce the potential for collateral damage in situations where 
the target is of an appropriate size considering the explosive yield of the munition 
and the surroundings of the target. The introduction of PGM is increasingly 
resulting in the evolution of doctrine and employment procedures for the range 
of weapons they have been adapted for, as evidenced by the modern guided 
aircraft bomb.
By 1972, laser guided bombs had been developed and brought into service 
and were capable of delivering munitions with a CEP of approximately 23 feet 
(7 m), resulting in direct hits 48% of the time (Werrell, 1998). The effectiveness 
Figure 7. German Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore gun L44 and L55  
(image credit: Thai Military and Asian Region).
37 Various other control surfaces and alternative methods are used to achieve course correction.
38 See Dullum et al., 2016.
120 mm L55
120 mm L44
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of explosive weapons in achieving their desired aims is significantly affected 
by the accuracy of the munitions employed. One study of the performance of 
laser-guided bombs found that they were between 100-200 times as effective 
as conventional bombs against hardened targets and between 20-40 times as 
effective against soft and area targets (Blachly, Conine & Sharkey, 1973).
An example is the GBU-12 (an Mk 82 bomb fitted with a laser-guidance package): 
in 1991, 66 U.S. aircraft destroyed 920 Iraqi armoured fighting vehicles in only two 
weeks (Blackwelder, 1993). The accuracy of the GBU-12 depends entirely upon 
the guidance system of the munition being able to maintain the line of sight to 
the laser target designator. Multiple factors can cause target loss, including rain, 
cloud, fog, smoke and dust, causing loss of guidance. Likewise, any hardware 
problems with the sensor unit of the bomb or the laser target designator could 
result in a loss of guidance. If this were to happen, the bomb might cease altering 
its trajectory, potentially impacting hundreds of metres from its intended target. 
In a populated area, there would be a clear risk of civilian casualties and damage 
to civilian infrastructure. In part to mitigate this risk, more advanced guided 
bomb unit iterations were developed which incorporated other sensor inputs and 
redundancies, to lower the reliance on laser guidance.
The GBU-38, like many modern ‘smart bombs’, is guided by both differential GPS 
technology and an inertial navigation system (INS). It has a CEP of approximately 
5 m, but this can be improved by the addition of further sensors designed to 
allow it to hit moving vehicles (Kopp, 2003). Unlike the laser-guided GBU-12, 
the GBU-38 is guided autonomously to the target once it has been dropped. 
There is no requirement for the GBU-38 to acquire a laser-marked target. Each 
individual GBU-38 can be assigned a different target by the systems of the delivery 
aircraft, meaning that one aircraft can accurately engage a number of targets 
simultaneously. The basic JDAM 39 guidance package can also be augmented by a 
range of other seeker heads, such as those using millimetre wave (MMW) imaging, 
referred to as Precision Terminal Homing Seekers. An example of a munition using 
an MMW imaging system is shown in Figure 9. The logical development of the 
guided bomb unit was to combine the laser-guidance of GBU-12 with the GPS/
INS of the GBU-38. The manufacturer produced the GBU-49 in the 2000s and it 
first entered service with the British Royal Air Force in 2008. The combination of 
guidance units allows the bomb to have the accuracy of a laser-guided weapon with 
the flexibility of having an all-weather capability. It has a CEP of 1.1 m. The GBU-49 
guidance unit cost US$ 42,000 in 2015 (Balle, 2015).
39 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM): a guidance kit that converts unguided bombs into 
all-weather ’smart’ munitions.
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TABLE 3
 APPROXIMATE CEP FIGURES FOR MK 82 VARIANTS
MUNITION CEP
Unguided Mk 82 variants 94.5 m
GBU-12 (laser-guided) 1.1 m
GBU-38 (GPS/INS guided) 5 m
GBU-38 (GPS jammed after release) 30 m
GBU-49 (enhanced GPS/INS and laser) 1.1 m (laser)
Source: Raytheon, 2006; 2016; U.S. Navy, 1999; 2001.
Whilst guided munitions for artillery guns, mortars and rockets are not as prevalent 
as their air-delivered counterparts, this is increasingly changing. PGM solutions 
for land service munitions provide increased firing accuracy, but also reduced 
munition consumption over their conventional counterparts, allowing for more fire 
missions and/or longer mission endurance before resupply becomes necessary. 
In-flight trajectory adjustments can be accomplished by a variety of methods, 
including fins, motor-control options and special pyrotechnic rotation charges 
(Jenzen-Jones, 2015).
Much like the ‘bolt-on’ guidance kits designed for conventional air-delivered 
bombs, many of the guidance solutions for land-based systems convert existing 
munitions into guided equivalents. For example, the U.S. military has introduced 
Figure 8. Comparative CEP of guided (GBU-12 Paveway II) and unguided Mk 82 aerial 
bombs, delivered from an altitude of 15,000 ft. (source: Raytheon, 2006).
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the XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK), which is a replacement fuze with course 
correction capability designed to significantly reduce the CEP of conventional 
155 mm artillery munitions to 50 m or less at all ranges. The cost of the XM1156 is 
nowadays less than US$ 10,000, much less than the US$ 70,000 to US$ 130,000 
of self-contained PGM equivalents (Gould, 2015). However, this is still considered 
to be too expensive for the majority of military forces, though inexpensive relative 
to precision guided missiles like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) 
at some US$ 1,000,000 each (Watts, 2013).
For mortars, the U.S. military’s precision guided mortar munition (PGMM) project 
has resulted in the development of the XM395 HE mortar projectile. The XM395 is 
a high explosive, GPS-guided 120 mm munition with a CEP of 10 m at its maximum 
range. As each XM395 costs about US$ 10,000 to manufacture, it is unlikely to 
replace conventional unguided mortar munitions (Calloway, 2011). Other countries 
are working on similar projects, but due to expense relative to the very low cost of 
conventional mortar projectiles, the deployment of these types of munitions will 
likely continue to be rare in the near term. 40
A Russian equivalent to the PGMM is the Gran – a laser-guided, rocket-assisted 
mortar projectile with a range of approximately 9000 m fired from rifled mortars, 
and 7000 m from smoothbore mortars. The manufacturer claims that the Gran has 
an equivalent high explosive effect to that of the 152 mm HE projectile (Nuţu, 2011). 
The Gran can engage both stationary and moving targets and delivers a warhead 
containing 5.3 kg of high explosive.
40 For more information on guided mortar systems, refer to Annex C.
Figure 9. XM395 precision guided mortar projectile (source: Orbital ATK).
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The impact of explosive munitions can be broken down into the principal damage 
mechanisms and their primary effects, and the secondary and tertiary effects 
occasioned by these. This section of the report focuses on the primary damage 
mechanisms and secondary effects of explosive weapons in populated areas. 
Tertiary effects, which can be classified as damage to health, social and economic 
infrastructure and services that occur over a longer time scale, e.g. the lack of 
clean water caused by damage to water mains and sewers, or the loss of electrical 
and gas services, are beyond the scope of this report. 41
Primary effects of explosive weapons are defined as those ‘caused directly by 
the destructive effects that radiate from a point of initiation and include blast 
overpressure, fragmentation, heat and light’ (GICHD, 2015b). These are attributed 
directly to the principal damage mechanism of an explosive weapon – blast, 
fragmentation and heat. The term ‘blast’ refers to a high-pressure blast wave 
moving at supersonic speed, referred to as the shockwave, which is followed by 
blast winds. Primary fragmentation comprises fragments that originate directly 
from the explosive munition. The third damage mechanism is the thermal energy 
released during the detonation of the explosive (Cross et al., 2016).
Most high explosive warheads are not designed to deliver an augmented 
incendiary effect and the thermal effect is limited to the immediate area of the 
detonation, as well as by its extremely short duration. Generally, the primary 
thermal hazard posed by an explosive weapon is less significant than the blast 
and fragmentation threats (SCWSD, 2011). As such, whilst it is acknowledged that 
thermal effects are present during the detonation of an explosive munition, and 
that they add to the total effects, these will not be addressed further in this report.
Secondary effects of explosive weapons derive from the environment in which 
the munition detonates. The most significant secondary effects include secondary 
fragmentation, firebrands, ground shock and cratering. Secondary fragmentation 
originates from objects that have been affected by the detonation, and can include 
such objects as pieces of masonry or glass from structures, or bone fragments 
from human or animal targets. Secondary fragments are generally larger than 
primary fragments and tend not to travel as fast, or as far (SCWSD, 2011).
Firebrands, or embers, consist of fragments heated to a very high temperature, 
are often on fire, and typically occur when an explosive munition detonates near 
flammable objects such as wooden structures or other munitions. Firebrands pose 
a hazard to other flammable material nearby, and can cause incendiary effects 
at a much greater distance than the primary thermal effects (Cross et al., 2016). 
41 For a fuller discussion of tertiary, or reverberating, effects, see Wille & Borrie, 2016.
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They can ignite surrounding flammable materials, producing heat, toxic gases 
and choking smoke.
Ground shock results from the energy imparted to the ground by the shockwave 
caused by an explosion and can result from a detonation under or on the ground, 
or in the air above (Cross et al., 2016). Ground shock poses an additional threat to 
the structural integrity of buildings, as the ground conducts the shockwave into 
the foundations and walls. It can also damage subterranean constructions such 
as sewage and water pipes, gas and electricity lines, or underground tunnels. 42
Cratering refers to the buckling and deformation of the ground around the 
detonation point (USDA, 2006). Both ground shock and cratering can cause 
substantial damage to underground critical infrastructure, including power, 
communications and water distribution. This may be a deliberate effect of explosive 
munitions optimised for cratering, intended to obstruct avenues of approach or 
to disrupt infrastructure. Such effects may have further humanitarian impacts. 
A cratering munition which prevents enemy use of a runway or airfield, for example, 
may also hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid by aircraft at a later date. If deep 
enough, cratering can also present a threat to underground structures.
Spalling presents an additional danger in urban environments. It is a stress wave 
effect most commonly observed in materials more brittle than metal. This occurs 
when an impact strikes the outer surface of a solid body, causing fragments to 
break off from the inside surface. The projectile or the fragment does not need to 
penetrate the solid body; merely striking the outer surface with sufficient energy 
may result in spalling. When considering the use of EWIPA, a possible scenario 
resulting in spalling is a brick wall being struck by a blast wave, or in some cases 
a projectile or a sufficiently energetic fragment, causing secondary fragmentation 
inside the building (‘spall’).
A significant hazard unique to urban environments is the risk of fatally compro-
mised structural integrity of buildings caused by the blast waves. Any people in 
and around those buildings and structures may be crushed by their partial, or 
complete collapse.
42 For examples and additional information, refer to ICRC, 2015.
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BLAST EFFECTS
An explosive is a material that is capable of producing an explosion by releasing 
the potential energy contained within it. All high explosives produce heat and gas. 
The rapid expansion of gas is the primary medium for measuring the power of 
an explosion (Cullis, 2001). When a high explosive charge detonates, it produces 
a blast wave (overpressure) that consists of two parts: a shock wave and a 
blast wind. The blast wave pushes outwards from the core of the detonation at 
supersonic speed. The outer edge of the blast wave is made up of the compressed 
gases contained in the surrounding air. This layer of compressed air is more 
properly described as a shock wave or shock front.
In open air, the blast decays extremely quickly with time and distance; typically it 
can be measured in milliseconds (Cross et al., 2016). The effect of the blast is the 
least difficult to quantify in open terrain, as the pressure from an explosion can be 
calculated from the magnitude (size) and velocity of detonation of the explosive 
charge and the measured distance from the point of detonation. On the figure 
below, the impulse is shown as the area under the positive phase of the pressure 
versus time curve.
Figure 10. Propagation of shock waves through a concrete wall’s media, and their 
reflection back as tension waves that crack the media and cause spalling of debris 
(source: Dynasystems Ltd. UK & GICHD).
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The blast wave has two phases. The positive pressure phase pushes a large portion 
of the surrounding air away from the core of the detonation at supersonic speed, 
leaving a broad partial vacuum behind it. When the blast wave of the positive 
pressure phase loses momentum, the partial vacuum behind it causes the 
compressed and displaced gases to reverse their movement and rush inward 
to fill the void. The negative pressure phase moves less quickly than the positive 
phase and it generally lasts approximately three times as long (Cullis, 2001).  43
The effect of the pressure wave upon a structure depends on what the structure 
is composed of and how it is built. In essence, it is dependent upon the structure’s 
natural frequency of vibration compared with the duration of the blast wave 
(Cullis, 2001). When the supersonic shock front from a detonation encounters 
a solid structure, some of the energy is reflected, and some of the energy is 
transmitted into the structure; the relative amounts depend on the properties of 
the structure.
43 The physics of blast waves is a complex subject. More precise knowledge of blast behaviour 
in different circumstances and environments requires advanced computer modelling. 
This project is developing such a model to simulate primary and secondary effects of the 
studied explosive weapons.
Figure 11. A visual representation of the blast wave, showing the pressure changes 
(source: Baskin & Holcomb, 2005; Dullum, 2010; GICHD, 2015).
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In the process of striking the structure, the shock front will impart significant momen-
tum to the exterior components. These components will be pushed towards the 
interior by the positive pressure wave, straining the resisting elements of the 
structure (such as support columns, building facades, etc.). Some of those resist-
ing elements, windows in particular, will fail.
As the negative pressure phase of the pressure passes back through the structure, 
the direction of the energy is reversed. Unlike the reflection of sound waves, which 
have a negligible effect on the medium through which they are travelling, shock 
waves are moving at such high speed and contain so much energy that they 
change the medium itself.
When the shock wave hits the ground, it is reflected back into the still-advancing 
blast wind. This amplifies the blast overpressure anywhere up to 20 times 44 that 
of the initial detonation (Smith & Hetherington, 1994; UFC, 2014).
44 Against rigid surfaces.
Figure 12. The effect of a blast wave on buildings and structures (source: FEMA et al., 2012).
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In urban areas, the structures reflect the shock wave in different directions. Due to 
the densely packed structures typical of such areas, the blast wave cannot freely 
move outwards from the point of detonation. This results in the blast wave being 
partially absorbed, reflected and channelled in and around structures. In addition 
to being reflected, the shock wave can also wrap around structures, effectively 
squeezing them from all sides simultaneously (FEMA et al., 2012).
A blast wave can be quantified by its peak pressure and its duration. Multiplying 
the peak pressure by the duration gives a value known as the blast impulse. When 
considering the damage potential of a blast wave, the impulse of the wave is a 
key factor.
TABLE 4
 
EFFECTS OF BLAST OVERPRESSURE AND BLAST WIND  
 ON STRUCTURES AND HUMAN BODY
PEAK 
OVERPRESSURE
MAXIMUM 
WIND SPEED
EFFECTS  
ON STRUCTURES
EFFECTS ON 
THE HUMAN BODY 45
7 kPa 17 m/s Window glass shatters Light injuries from 
fragments occur
14 kPa 31 m/s Moderate damage to 
houses (windows and 
doors blown out and 
severe damage to roofs)
People injured  
by flying glass 
and debris
21 kPa 46 m/s Residential structures 
collapse
Serious injuries are 
common, fatalities 
may occur
34.5 kPa 73 m/s Most buildings  
collapse
Injuries are  
universal, fatalities 
are widespread
69 kPa 131 m/s Reinforced concrete 
buildings are severely 
damaged or demolished
Most people  
are killed
138 kPa 224 m/s Heavily built concrete 
buildings are severely 
damaged or demolished
Fatalities  
approach 100%
Pressure units converted from pounds per square inch (PSI) to kilopascal (Pa), and speed units 
from miles per hour to metres per second (source: Zipf & Cashdollar, n.d.).
45 For a fuller discussion on the effects of explosive weapons on the human body, see Brevard, 
Champion, & Katz, 2012.
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Blast effects example (MK 82 aircraft bomb)
In its simplest configuration, the standard Mk 82 bomb contains approximately 
89 kg of high explosive in a forged steel body weighing 142 kg (Glass et al., 1997). 
According to one manufacturer, the detonation of a Mk 82 aircraft bomb produces 
a peak overpressure of 117 kPa at 16 m from the point of detonation. The design 
fragment from this weapon is less than 20 grams travelling at 2400 m/s, and at this 
distance the natural fragments generated by the detonation will penetrate up to 
32 mm of steel armour plate. After 16 m the velocity is reduced below 1900 m/s. 
It will then be capable of penetrating up to 200 mm of concrete (ConWep, 2016).
The peak overpressure reduces to 34 kPa at a distance of 31 m (Ordtech, n.d.). 
Assuming that the point of detonation is the centre of a circle, a radius of 31 m 
produces a circle with an area of 3019 m2. Within this area, a Mk 82 aircraft bomb 
will cause the collapse of most buildings, severely damage heavily built concrete 
structures and produce injuries to all persons present, killing the majority of them. 
Depending on the type of ground it hits, the angle of impact and other factors, the 
Mk 82 will produce a crater with a diameter of between 4.6 to 10.7 m and depth 
between 0.76 and 4.27 m (Ordtech, n.d.).
Photo 1. An Mk 82 bomb detonation in a test environment  
(photo credit: Federation of American Scientists).
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FRAGMENTATION
Primary fragmentation originates from the casing of the typically metallic 46 warhead 
surrounding the high explosive charge. Fragments can take a variety of shapes and 
sizes, and are primarily effective in an anti-personnel capacity. When a warhead 
has not been treated for pre-fragmentation, the detonation of the high explosive will 
cause the warhead to splinter, resulting in what is known as natural fragmentation.
Some warheads are scored, or treated with heat or chemicals, to encourage 
the metal casing to fragment along pre-determined stress lines. Pre-fragmented 
munition casings can result in a denser spread of fragments than might occur 
with munitions relying on natural fragmentation. Consistency in fragmentation can 
greatly enhance the lethality and efficiency of munitions. Pre-formed fragments are 
increasingly preferred in many munition designs. Such fragments are often held 
in a matrix of polymer or light metal, and provide even greater consistency than 
pre-fragmented designs. The inclusion of pre-formed fragments is often combined 
with pre-fragmented outer casings on munitions.
The type of steel used in the manufacture of the warhead plays a significant role 
in determining the nature of the natural fragmentation that is produced. High 
explosive warheads are typically made from either forged or cast steel or iron 
(Ryan, 1982). Cast metals are melted down and poured into moulds to form the 
shape of the projectile, whereas forged steel projectiles are formed by beating 
red-hot steel ingots into the desired shape.
In 1968, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment carried out a series of 
trials to establish the lethal area for 81 mm and 120 mm HE mortar projectiles. 47 
It was discovered that when the explosive within a forged steel projectile 
detonates, it produces fewer fragments than would be produced by a cast steel 
body of the same dimensions. When calculating the lethal area for prone human 
targets, cast iron cases produced approximately three times as many fragments as 
forged steel casings (Jacobsen & Strømsøe, 1968). A smaller number of fragments 
from the same total mass indicates that the fragments will generally be larger 
than those produced by a cast warhead. Such larger fragments would be more 
effective against lightly armoured targets, but the smaller number of fragments 
would generally make forged steel warheads less lethal against softer targets 
(i.e. human beings) than cast warheads.
46 Conventional ordnance casings made from non-metallic materials, whilst rare, have been 
employed in conflict zones (Jenzen-Jones, 2016). Non-metallic fragmentation may also be 
used in conjunction with conventional ordnance and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
47 Refer to Annex C for additional information regarding mortar lethal effects.
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Table 5 gives the hazardous fragment distances (HFD) in metres for a nominal 
munition with a given net explosive quantity (NEQ) in kg TNT equivalent – one 
of the models used to assess fragmentation hazards. The HFD represents the 
distance at which the density of fragments in the air will likely reduce to 1 per 
55.7 m2. The HFD distance is one with a low probability of being hit by a hazardous 
fragment, and if one were hit after all, the impact would not be lethal (SCWSD, 
2011). 48 Note that the HFD does not represent the maximum range that fragments 
may travel – individual fragments can be found more than 3048 m further than 
the HFD (U.S. DoD, 2008).
TABLE 5
 
HAZARDOUS FRAGMENT DISTANCES (HFD) FOR GIVEN NET  
 EXPLOSIVE QUANTITY (NEQ) 49
NEQ (KG) HFD (M) NEQ (KG) HFD (M)
0.45 87 11.35 164
0.91 104 22.70 180
1.36 113 34.05 190
2.27 126 45.40 197
4.54 142 113.50 304
Source: U.S. Department of the Army, 2013.
In order to calculate the effectiveness of a warhead against a given target area, it is 
necessary to calculate the hit probability for the fragmentation that is produced. 
The fragmentation effect can be quantified by the two-dimensional function p(x,y), 
which is the probability of being affected by the weapon when the position of the 
target is given by the ground coordinates (x,y). Once the injury probability function 
has been established, the effect of the munition can be stated as a single quantity 
called lethal area. The probability that a given target is hit by at least one fragment 
reduces with distance. The further a target is from the point of detonation, the less 
likely it is to be hit by the fragmentation produced.
48 A hazardous fragment is one having an impact energy of 58 ft-lbs or greater (SCWSD, 2011). 
Hazardous fragments with an impact energy between 15 J and 79 J are considered 
capable of causing ‘serious injury’, whilst fragments of 79 J or greater ‘severe injury or death’ 
respectively (U.S. Department of Energy, 2012).
49 Table adapted from the USDA; units converted from imperial (pounds, feet) to metric 
(kilograms, metres).
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At a given distance a larger target is more likely to be hit. Military modelling 
assumes that the targeted soldiers are in the prone position and present an area 
of 0.5 m2. As described in Risk estimate distances (RED) for selected munitions 
(Table 10, p. 84), RED represent the expected percentage of incapacitation (PI) 
for unprotected personnel, with for example 10 PI being the equivalent of 10% 
of the affected soldiers rendered unable to continue fighting (U.S. Army, 2007). 
RED are primarily derived from the fragmentation radius of a given munition, 
as well as the characteristics of the delivery system; that is, both the effects and 
the precision of the system in question. It associates this combination with a 
percentage representing the likelihood of incapacitation.
Buildings can provide a degree of protection from primary fragmentation. Primary 
fragmentation may penetrate some surfaces, such as those made from softer 
materials, but generally loses a significant amount of energy and often proves less 
lethal after it penetrates certain materials. The fragments may, however, ricochet 
off hard, thick surfaces and may continue to pose a risk to people in the open.
Nonetheless, the majority of the fragment’s energy would likely be absorbed in the 
initial impact, rendering it less hazardous as a result. A modern urban environment, 
composed of brick, stone and concrete structures, would provide a much greater 
level of protection from primary fragmentation than the weaker structures often 
found for example in shanty towns or refugee camps.
The weight of each fragment is a significant factor in determining the amount of 
damage it can cause, as well as its likely lethal range. The less mass the fragment 
has, the lower its momentum.
Secondary fragments are generally larger than primary fragments and typically do 
not travel as far or at as high a velocity as primary fragments (often at hundreds, 
rather than thousands of feet per second) (USDAF, 2011). However, urban 
environments may generate a range of secondary fragmentation effects not found 
on the open battlefield.
Window glass for instance, often forms a significant proportion of the secondary 
fragmentation. 50 These fragments are caused by the high-pressure blast wave 
moving through the air and shattering windows, rather than the transmission of 
the shockwave through a solid medium. Structures making significant use of glass 
– increasingly commonplace in urbanised areas – can be particularly sensitive to 
the effects of high explosive detonations (Balogh, 2010). One example of how 
50 For further information on the effects of blast on glass, refer to Balogh, 2010.
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dangerous glass can be as a form of secondary fragmentation can be seen from 
analysis of the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia: 95% of the 
survivors suffered injuries from fragmentation; of these, 88% were injured by glass 
(Thompson, Brown, Mallonee, & Sunshine, 2004).
Calculating the effects of primary fragmentation is more complicated than the blast 
effect, owing to the number of known unknowns. In many cases, the initial velocity 
(speed and impact angle) of the warhead at the time of detonation is not known, 
nor is the exact shape, weight and aerodynamic performance of each fragment. 
Warheads utilising pre-formed fragmentation or pre-fragmented munitions casings 
will be easier to predict, generating more consistent fragmentation effects. The 
type of fuze will also affect the fragmentation pattern (See Fuzing, p. 66 and Fuze 
selection, p. 96). Due to the greater variation in the size and number of fragments 
caused by the explosion, natural fragmentation is more difficult to predict and 
model. The effect of fragmentation on human targets is particularly unpredictable, 
as the amount of exposed body area and the posture of the target can have a 
marked influence on the potential harm.
The angle at which a munition impacts the target has a significant bearing 
on the size and shape of the lethal area. In simple terms, the higher the angle 
(toward vertical 90°) of fall, the larger the lethal area will be. 51 In order to maximize 
lethal area, at higher angles of fall (45-90°) the optimal height for detonation is 
approximately 2 m above ground, although even at just above ground, the lethal 
area is increased (Jacobsen & Strømsøe, 1968). The 5 February 1994 attack on 
Markale market, Sarajevo (Case Study D1), is indicative of the devastation which 
can be caused by a single munition falling at high angle and detonating above 
ground level. The size of the Markale market, approximately 1000 m2 with tall 
buildings surrounding it from all sides, makes it a relatively small, enclosed space. 
Such a space, coupled to a high density of people in it, makes it particularly 
vulnerable to a fragmenting warhead falling from above.
Primary fragmentation effect example (9M22)
An example of the fragmentation effects of a high explosive munition can be seen 
in the common 122 mm artillery rocket type BM-21, model 9M22. The warhead 
of this munition contains 6.4 kg of TGAF-5 52 high explosive composition and 
generates 3,920 representative fragments from scored diamond patterns on the 
51 See Annex C for a more complete explanation, along with a table of the lethal area relative to 
angle of fall.
52 TGAF-5 is comprised of 40% TNT, 40% RDX, 17% Aluminium powder and 3% phlegmatiser 
(Nitrochem, 2015). Later, these munitions used A-IX-2 (Karpenko, 2010).
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inside of the munition casing (USSR Ministry of Defence, 1971). The figures below 
show an example of natural fragmentation (Figure 13) and controlled fragmentation 
(Figure 14).
The warhead of the rocket 9M22 is designed to produce some 1,640 fragments, 
each weighing approximately 2.4 g, and 2,280 fragments of approximately 2.9 g, 
for a total of 3,920 fragments. In reality, there will be a much larger total number 
of fragments, some of them microscopic, and a smaller number of those weighing 
approximately 2.4 g and 2.9 g. This is because the detonation and resulting 
blast cannot be evenly distributed throughout the warhead, resulting in uneven 
fracturing. Although there may be fewer optimally sized fragments than intended, 
some of these will be significantly heavier. The heavier fragments will carry more 
momentum than the smaller fragments, which will increase the range at which 
they are capable of causing damage to people, vehicles and structures. The 
area forward of where these rockets land will be struck with significantly more 
fragmentation than the area behind, owing to the angle of incidence and ballistic 
inertia of the rocket.
It is important to consider that MBRL such as the 122 mm BM-21 are commonly 
used to deliver salvo fire, and that a full barrage from just one system – meaning 
forty 122 mm rockets – would deliver 256 kg of high explosive composition and 
produce a total of approximately 156,800 controlled fragments and some 60 kg 
of additional natural fragmentation, spread over a lethal area of 600 x 600 m 
(Jelic et al., 2013).
Figures 13 and 14. Natural fragmentation (left) from a mortar projectile recovered in Baghdad, 
Iraq in Jan 2006 (photo credit: Bryan G. / U.S. Army), and a section of pre-fragmented 
munition casing (right) (source: USDA, 2006, p. 20). 
54 | Effects of high explosive munitions
With a range of 20 km, an impact angle of 32° (up from horizontal), a velocity of 
333 m/s, and a rotation of 600 rpm, the detonation of a single 9M22 rocket will 
produce the fragmentation patterns shown in Figure 16. The image on the left 
shows the probable distribution of natural fragmentation; the area affected by the 
explosion (measured in metres); and a colour code wherein red denotes 80-100% 
potential lethality and dark blue 0-20%. The image on the right shows the same 
for a pre-fragmented munition.
The fragmentation effect of a full salvo of forty 122 mm rockets has been modelled 
in Figure 16, which assumes that an impact fuze has been used.
Figure 16. Simulated distribution of primary fragmentation in an open area for natural (left), and 
pre-fragmented (right) munition. The attack direction is from the bottom (source: Jelic et al., 2013).
Figure 15. The figure on the left illustrates the distribution of natural fragmentation and on 
the right, the fragments generated from pre-fragmented material. The attack direction is 
from the bottom (source: Jelic et al., 2013).
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As it can be observed, there is a very high hit probability at short distances from 
the point of detonation and the probability drops steeply as the distance increases.
Figure 17 shows only the hit probability for the primary fragmentation generated 
by the pre-fragmented warhead of a single 122 mm 9M22 Grad rocket. The 
rocket will also generate approximately 1.5 kg of natural fragmentation, but the 
number of fragments likely to be formed from this cannot be accurately predicted 
(Jelic et al., 2013).
The lethal area for a 122 mm Grad rocket is given as 700 m2 for each high explosive 
warhead that detonates upon striking the ground (Dullum, 2010). 700 m2 is roughly 
equivalent to a circle with a radius of 15 m. When the lethal area is known, it is 
possible to estimate the probability of being incapacitated at a given distance 
from the point of detonation. It should be acknowledged that this only considers 
the detonation of a single munition; when multiple munitions impact across an 
area, there will commonly be overlap of the lethal areas. Table 6 presents the 
probability of incapacitation at different distances from the detonation point of 
one 9M22 type rocket.
Figure 17. Hit probability for fragmentation from a 122 mm 9M22 rocket  
(source: Jelic et al., 2013).
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TABLE 6
 
PROBABILITY OF INCAPACITATION OVER DISTANCE  
 (122 MM 9M22 TYPE ROCKET)
DISTANCE FROM POINT OF IMPACT PROBABILITY OF INCAPACITATION
3 m 96%
6 m 85%
10 m 64%
15 m 36%
20 m 17%
Source: Dullum, 2010.
BLAST EFFECTS ON THE HUMAN BODY
Reflected blast waves are significantly more damaging to the human body than 
incident overpressure.
A study from 1996 compared incidences of detonations in buses (enclosed areas) 
to those in open areas and demonstrated that there was a significantly higher 
number of deaths in enclosed spaces 53 (Leibovici et al., 1996) and that the injuries 
suffered by those in enclosed areas were more severe than those in the open. 
It concluded that there was ‘significantly increased morbidity and mortality among 
those in confined-space bombings compared to those in open-space attacks’ 
(Brevard, Champion, & Katz, 2012).
Blast injuries to the eyes and limbs are rare, but result in quite serious injuries. 
When blast waves remove limbs, the patient is unlikely to survive the loss of blood. 
In cases where the patient does survive such a traumatic amputation, the limbs 
can rarely be reattached.
53 It should be noted that the attacks studied involved IEDs rather than conventional high 
explosive weapons, which would have different patterns and types of fragmentation.
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In open spaces, 8% of those affected died, compared to 49% for enclosed spaces 
(see below Table 7).
TABLE 7
 INJURIES AND DEATHS CAUSED IN OPEN VS. ENCLOSED SPACES
OPEN SPACE ENCLOSED SPACE
Deaths
8% 49%
Injuries
• Primary Blast Injuries 34% 77%
• Burns (total body surface area) 18% 31%
• Injury Severity: (median value 
using Injury Severity Score)
4 (minor) 18 (moderate/severe)
Source: Leibovici et al., 1996.
The severity of the injuries sustained can be evaluated using the injury severity 
score (ISS), which is an anatomical scoring system for classifying the severity of 
wounds on patients with multiple injuries (Stevenson et al., 2001). In open spaces, 
the injuries suffered had a median score of 4 on the ISS, which is considered to be 
minor. For people injured in closed spaces, the effects were more serious, with the 
injuries suffered having a median score of 18 on the ISS, considered to represent 
moderate to severe injuries (see above Table 7) (Leibovici et al., 1996).
The fact that detonations in enclosed spaces cause generally more significant 
primary blast and fragmentation injuries than those that occur in the open is 
predominantly caused by the reflection and subsequent intensification of blast 
waves within the enclosed space. The blast effects are capable of causing 
significant injuries to the human body.
The lungs are particularly vulnerable to blast effects. An overpressure of 0.25 MPa 
(approx. 2.4 atmospheres) is associated with possible lung injury and at 0.5 MPa 
the probability of serious lung injury is 50%. The risk is magnified in confined 
spaces such as rooms or vehicles. Detonations in open spaces cause fewer lung 
injuries, and those injuries caused tend to be less serious than those in closed 
spaces (Brevard et al., 2012).
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Some lung injuries are immediately 
apparent, while others appear over a 
period of hours or days. The X-ray on 
the right shows severe bruising of the 
lung (pulmonary contusion) on the right 
of the picture, as a result of a blast injury. 
This is the lighter, triangular-shaped area 
in the lower part of the lung. As a result of 
this type of injury, blood and other types 
of body fluids gather in the tissues of the 
lungs, preventing the lung from absorb-
ing its normal amount of oxygen. This 
can have serious, sometimes fatal, conse-
quences (Baskin & Holcomb, 2005).
Blast also causes other types of injury. Unlike buildings and structures, which can 
sustain varying amounts of damage from both the positive and negative phases of the 
blast wave, the human body sustains the majority of injuries during the positive phase.
The blast wave causes a rapid compression and then expansion of the gases 
contained in hollow organs, such as the gastro-intestinal tract, lungs and ears. The 
blast overpressure damages air-filled human organs, causing bruising, tearing and 
puncturing of the organ walls. The pressure wave can rupture the eardrum and 
fracture the delicate bones inside the ear.
The rapid compression and then re-inflation of these organs may result in tearing 
which is principally caused by the acceleration of organ and muscle tissue at 
different rates due to their different densities. Solid organs, such as the kidneys 
and liver, are not as susceptible to direct damage from blast waves as hollow 
organs, but the shear force imparted by blast waves can cause these to be torn 
from their attachment points within the body (Hernad, 2013).
The brain can be damaged by being suddenly accelerated and then decelerated. 
This often damages the brain’s occipital and frontal lobes, in what is known as 
a coup-contrecoup contusion (Cernak & Noble-Haeusslein, 2010). Some brain 
injuries, known as traumatic brain injuries (TBI), may not be immediately apparent 
and victims will present no physical symptoms. The mechanisms of these injuries 
are not yet fully understood, but apparently even mild TBI can result in cases of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). One study of American troops returning 
from Iraq and Afghanistan showed that 44% of personnel who suffered what 
appeared to be a mild TBI, but lost consciousness later, suffered from PTSD 
(Xydakis, Robbins, & Grant, 2008).
Photo 2. X-ray of severe bruising of 
the lung (right) as a result of a blast injury  
(source: Brevard et al., 2012).
Effects of high explosive munitions | 59
FRAGMENTATION EFFECTS ON THE HUMAN BODY
When examining the effects of fragmentation on the human body, it is important to 
note that these vary significantly based on the amount of body area exposed to the 
fragmentation and the posture of the victim when struck. A similarly sized piece of 
fragmentation could kill one person but only lightly injure another, depending on its 
impact location and each person’s unique physiology. Low-velocity fragments may 
tumble on impact with a body, which causes a larger wound track with irregular 
tearing that is difficult to repair. Bigger fragments travelling at lower velocities 
can crush large areas of human tissue and cause more damage than the same 
fragment travelling at a high velocity. This runs counter to the previously accepted 
notion that fragments travelling at a higher velocity will always result in a more 
severe wound (U.S. DoD, 2004).
Most of the people injured by explosive devices suffer from multiple penetrating 
fragment injuries to more than one area of the body. The fragments produced 
by the detonation of a high explosive warhead are often irregularly shaped. 
Figure 18. Blast-induced trauma to the brain (source: Cernak & Noble-Haeusslein, 2010).
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This means that the aerodynamic drag of each fragment is different, and therefore 
the velocity of each fragment is also different. This is an important consideration 
when determining the effect these fragments can have on the human body. The 
impact of a small fragment in the torso of a human being is likely to prove fatal 
at velocities in excess of 600 m/s (Bowyer, Cooper, & Rice, 1996). When high 
explosive munitions are involved, initial velocities of primary fragments can be as 
high as 2500 m/s.
The risk of injury from blast overpressure is represented by a smaller radius than 
the risk of fragment injury, as blast pressure drops much more rapidly than the 
rate that fragments lose velocity. For detonations that occur in open spaces, the 
majority of injuries will be caused by fragmentation (see Table 8).
TABLE 8
 
INJURIES IN OPEN SPACE FROM A TYPICAL HE 155 MM PROJECTILE 
 AT VARIOUS DISTANCES 54
DISTANCE FROM DETONATION MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
Blast injury Fragmentation injury
0 to 15 m Death, eardrum rupture Death
15 to 25 m Eardrum rupture Death
25 to 40 m Temporary hearing injury Injury
40 to 550 m None Possible injury
Source: Champion, Holcomb, & Young, 2009.
Secondary fragmentation can cause significant medical complications by further 
fragmenting on impact, leaving many small fragments embedded in the body. The 
eyes are particularly vulnerable to secondary fragmentation injuries from small 
particles of shattered glass or metal: approximately 10% of all blast injury survivors 
are left with significant eye injuries of this nature (Lemonick, 2011). The wounds 
usually contain dust, dirt and small parts of clothing. Large explosions may cause 
buildings to collapse and crush people, or expose them to the risks inherent in 
inhaling large quantities of fine dust particles.
54 Table adapted and units converted from imperial (feet) to metric.
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Photo 3. Example of the density of multiple primary and secondary fragmentation wounds 
on a human body (source: O’Brien PJ, Cox MW – CC).
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Whilst this report is primarily concerned with the well-known, design-dependent 
effects of particular weapon systems and munitions, the circumstances under 
which such systems are used can have a significant impact on their actual effects. 
The specific influence of these circumstances on precision and accuracy cannot be 
predicted for each use. Nonetheless, it is well established that explosive weapons 
are often used in conditions other than optimal. Acceptable margins of deviation 
from optimal conditions can be observed in standing targeting policies and rules 
of engagement, including weapon-target matching, described below. When 
assessing the impact of explosive weapons in populated areas, it is therefore 
important to consider the manner in which such systems are used and the 
targeting procedures, which may or may not have taken place.
In modern military forces, weapon systems are employed according to a series 
of rules and regulations. These range from a targeting policy, set at the highest 
level by policymakers and their military staff, down to the rules of engagement 
(ROE) that govern individual soldier’s actions in conflict. Targeting policy defines 
how targets are engaged within the confines of national and international law, 
in pursuit of national politico-military objectives. ROE directly inform the tactical 
and operational employment of individual weapon systems. They can vary across 
different geographic areas, over time within a conflict, and according to the system 
or munition used (Dullum et al., 2016). Targeting policies and ROE vary between 
different national forces. Such frameworks are often noticeably absent from the 
actions of non-state actors; however, some groups may follow their own targeting 
‘code’ which may limit their combat actions.
The targeting of a given weapon system is conducted either deliberately, or in 
contact with the enemy. 55 Strategic and operational targets are often subject to 
deliberate targeting, tactical targets far less so. Deliberate targeting is a formal and 
complex process. It requires planning in advance of the employment of a system, 
approval from the appropriate higher authority and a formal collateral damage 
estimate (CDE). CDE are conducted to predict unintended or incidental damage 
to persons and/or objects which are not the intended target and which are not 
otherwise lawful targets (U.S. DoD, 2013). Targets are almost invariably on a target 
list, which may include ‘strike’ and ‘no strike’ lists, each with their own parameters. 
Common target lists include a master target list, joint target list, no-strike list and 
restricted target list (MoD, n.d.).
55 This may not mean that the unit operating the weapon system is in contact; it may be that 
a battery of artillery guns, for example, is responding to a call for fire support from a unit 
in contact.
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Conversely, targeting which takes place whilst in contact is time-sensitive in 
nature; if it includes a CDE, it will be expedient in nature, known as a field CDE 
(Cross et al., 2015; Dullum et al., 2016). Some military doctrines consider that there 
is an absolute right of self-defence in the face of a direct attack or immediate threat 
of one. Under international humanitarian law, the prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks and the rule of proportionality and distinction in attack must be respected 
at all times, even under conditions of self-defence 56 (ICRC, 1987). Air-delivered 
munitions are more likely to be used under deliberate targeting parameters, 
whereas the other systems addressed in this report are more likely to be employed 
in contact.
Where the risk of collateral damage is high, the decision on whether to engage a 
target may be referred up the chain of command. This can happen at the tactical 
level, with an individual combatant seeking approval from a squad leader, up to 
the strategic level, where political approval may be required. This process may 
also be conducted on a formal basis, according to predetermined requirements 
and parameters, or informally under field conditions. ROE directly inform this 
approvals process and will specify which actions by an adversary permit the use 
of force. It may also place limitations on the method of the attack, including the 
type of fuze or munition used, or the weight of fire applied (Dullum et al., 2016). The 
desired and permissible effects are achieved by correct weapon-target matching, 
taking into account the factors outlined in previous sections concerning precision 
and accuracy.
WEAPON-TARGET MATCHING
At a fundamental level, weapon systems and their munitions are selected for an 
attack based upon the effects the combatants wish to impose on a given target. 
The process of weapon-target matching, also known as ‘weaponeering’, seeks to 
ensure that the correct platform, system and munition are assigned to achieve the 
desired aims (Cross et al., 2016). Weaponeering may take place under deliberate 
targeting conditions, wherein it is constrained by political and military requirements 
and restrictions informed by a robust CDE, or as part of a response to friendly forces 
in contact, in which case the process may be significantly abbreviated. In both 
cases, and especially when taking place in an abbreviated form, weapon-target 
matching is limited by the assets available to the planner or operator.
56 In relation to the definition of ‘attack’, 1987 ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions states that ‘the restrictions imposed by humanitarian law on the use 
of force should be observed both by troops defending themselves and by those who are 
engaged in an assault or taking the offensive’.
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Weapon-target matching begins by determining which weapon system of those 
available from a given range of platforms is appropriate for the objective at hand. 
A battery of artillery guns firing unguided projectiles, for example, is unlikely 
to be suitable for engaging a point target in a populated area. An air-delivered 
PGM may be deemed a more appropriate choice for such a target, assuming that 
the selected munition’s explosive yield does not enable primary and secondary 
explosive weapon effects beyond the target limits.
Weaponeering is also concerned with selecting the correct munition and fuze 
combination, which can dramatically change the effects of a system. There are 
many ways to attack a target beyond the standard high explosive projectile and 
point detonating fuze (Dullum et al., 2016). Whilst this report is concerned with the 
use of high explosive munitions, it is important to understand the range of options 
that may be available to certain belligerents.
FUZING
A fuze is a mechanical or electronic initiating device designed to function a 
munition. The way a fuze functions has a direct relationship with the nature of the 
effects of the munition it is fitted to. The fuze serves three main roles: (1) ensuring 
a munition can be safely handled during the loading process and in transit; (2) 
arming the munition at a given time or position; and (3) ensuring the munition 
functions at a given time or position (King, 2011). For most systems currently in 
service, the fuze must be selected at the time it is fitted to the munition. However, 
some modern multi-function fuzes offer a variety of fuzing options, and a subset of 
these may allow the operator to select the desired mode of operation immediately 
prior to use (King, 2011). Most fuzes have an arming sequence initiated by inertia, 
or other forces or mechanisms occasioned by the firing, launch or release of the 
munition. The three common types of fuzes are defined by their firing function: 
impact, time and proximity.
The most common fuze typically used with explosive munitions is the impact, or 
point-detonating 57, fuze. Impact fuzes are generally simple in operation, detonating 
on the direct impact or rapid deceleration (caused by impact) of the munition. 
Whilst many impact fuzes detonate almost immediately upon impact, other 
examples often incorporate a delay of milliseconds or more (USAFAS, 2004). 
A short delay allows for a munition to explode inside a target (e.g. A concrete 
57 Base-detonating fuzes also exist, as do ‘all-ways impact’ fuzes. The latter functions without 
regard to the orientation of the munition during impact and is most commonly seen in use 
with explosive submunitions.
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bunker), or underneath it (i.e. subsurface). If a point-detonating fuze is designed 
for an instantaneous explosion it is known as a ‘super quick’ fuze 58 (King, 2011).
Time fuzes function after a predetermined delay, rather than relying on a physical 
input such as impact. The three most common varieties are mechanical time, 
electronic time or powder train time fuzes. 59 Time fuzes are most commonly 
used in conjunction with cargo munitions, however they can be used with high 
explosive munitions, such as when seeking to achieve an airburst effect. Time 
fuzes operate in seconds, minutes, hours or days – orders of magnitude greater 
than the very short delay incorporated into some impact fuzes (Dullum et al., 2016). 
Certain time fuzes incorporate backup impact fuzing options. 60
Proximity, or ‘variable time’ fuzes detonate a munition at a specific distance from 
the target. A proximity fuze generally uses radio waves 61 to determine when to 
detonate the munition. When employed against ground targets, proximity fuzes 
are most often used to ‘airburst’ a munition (USAFAS, 2004), i.e. detonate before 
the impact in the air, at a set distance from the target.
The choice of fuze is critical in understanding how militaries make choices in 
tailoring a weapon’s effects during the targeting process (Cross et al., 2016). When 
assessing how a fuze influences collateral effects, consider a concentration of 
enemy troops in a populated area. Munitions fitted with proximity or time fuzes set 
to deliver an airburst effect may be used to enhance the blast and fragmentation 
effects against personnel or other comparatively fragile targets. An airburst fuze 
on a conventional munition can increase its area effect by up to 100% (Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, n.d.), which in broad terms means that fewer munitions 
are required to achieve the desired aim. Employing airburst munitions in a densely 
populated area will potentially significantly increase civilian harm.
58 Many common point detonating fuzes for projectiles allow the operator to select either the 
super quick action, or a short delay allowing, typically, a high explosive projectile to penetrate 
the target prior to detonating.
59 Chemical and material fatigue delay mechanisms also exist, but these have fallen out of favour 
with modern militaries due to reliability issues (Dullum et al., 2016).
60 These are commonly ‘time super quick’ and ‘mechanical time super quick’ (USAFAS, 2004).
61 Optical, acoustic, magnetic influence, infrared and other types have also been developed 
(Dullum et al., 2016).
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This section introduces the studied 122 mm BM-21 multi barrel rocket launcher 
(MBRL); 152 mm and 155 mm artillery guns; 81 mm and 82 mm medium 
mortars and 120 mm heavy mortars; 115 mm, 120 mm and 125 mm tank guns; 
and the guided and unguided variants of the Mk 82 aircraft bomb. After a brief 
introduction of each system’s technical characteristics, utility and typical roles in 
conflict theatres, common high explosive munitions employed by these weapon 
systems are presented and compared with each other. Among the specifications 
for each munition type, the comparison shows their relative energetic payloads 
delivered, allowing an estimation of their hazardous ranges in open space. 
The annexes A through E 62 of the report provide more detailed information about 
the weapon systems and common high explosive munitions employed, as well as 
presenting the case studies 63 of their use in populated areas.
122 MM BM-21 TYPE MULTI BARREL ROCKET LAUNCHER (MBRL)
62 Annex A: 122 mm BM-21 MBRL, Annex B: 152 mm & 155 mm artillery guns,  
Annex C: 81–120 mm mortars, Annex D: 115–125 mm tank guns, Annex E: Mk 82 aircraft bomb.
63 Case studies are referred to throughout this report with an alphanumeric designation, for example, 
D3 refers to Case Study 3 in Annex D: 115-125 mm tank guns.
Photo 4. A BM-21 Grad type multi barrel rocket launcher firing rockets, Devichki, Ukraine 
(photo credit: Popsuievych / Shutterstock.com).
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Since its introduction in the early 1960s, the presence and use of 122 mm BM-21 
Grad (Град; ‘Hail’) type multi barrel rocket launchers has been prevalent in conflict 
zones throughout the world. Its simplicity, combined with the ability to deliver 
massive firepower from a relatively light mobile platform, has led to its rapid, 
widespread adoption. This weapon system has been widely copied and these 
copies, variants and derivatives can be found in the inventories of over 50 state 
armed forces, as well as numerous non-state armed groups (Schroeder, 2014; 
IISS, 2010).
As the BM-21 is a relatively old design, first developed in the late 1950s, some 
of these variants have resulted in the inclusion of more modern weapon char-
acteristics, such as advanced fire-control systems and more advanced aerodynamic 
properties for the rockets themselves. This report limits itself to the study of the 
original BM-21 (the 9K51 in Soviet service) and those copies and variants which 
closely approximate the characteristics of the BM-21. 122 mm variants of the 
BM-21 that are significantly more modern than the original design have not 
been widely employed in conflict zones, and are not addressed in this report.
The Russian nickname ‘Hail’ is an appropriate moniker for a weapon system that 
can launch up to forty 122 mm rockets in just under 20 seconds, at ranges of up 
to 20 km 64. Designed to deliver its munitions over an area rather than at a point 
target, the BM-21 is not a precision weapon; at a range of 20 km, when a full salvo 
of 40 rockets is fired, the lethal area extends up to 600 m x 600 m (Jelic et al., 
2013). When the rockets impact, they produce a substantial fragmentation effect.
The multiple instances of its use in populated areas across the world have resulted 
in significant numbers of civilian deaths and injuries. 65 In addition to the human 
cost of using 122 mm MBRLs in populated areas, there has been devastating 
damage to civilian objects including residential buildings, businesses and critical 
infrastructure.
For more information on 122 mm BM-21 type MBRLs, refer to Annex A.
64 The most modern Russian rockets can extend this range to 40 km (Splav, n.d.).
65 See Annexes A–E, and, for example, Four Years of Harm: Explosive Violence Monitor 2011-
2014 by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).
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152 MM & 155 MM ARTILLERY GUNS
Artillery guns are designed to provide fire support for armour and infantry forces by 
firing munitions at greater distances than small arms and light weapons. Artillery 
guns typically operate as a unit, or ‘battery’, and are intended to deliver salvo 
fire against an area target. They can either be towed or self-propelled, and can 
be armoured or unarmoured. Modern artillery systems primarily exist to deliver 
indirect fire onto targets. In this report, the term ‘artillery gun’ is used to refer 
specifically to self-propelled, towed and emplaced guns (i.e. not man-portable) 
of a calibre greater than 57 mm, which are designed for an indirect fire role and 
capable of hitting targets at a considerable range (Ferguson et al., 2015).
Artillery guns in 152 mm or 155 mm calibres can be found in the majority of 
current and recent conflicts that involve at least one regular army, and many 
that involve primarily non-state actors. The Warsaw Pact nations selected guns 
chambered for the 152 mm calibre developed in the Soviet Union, while NATO 
members and other ‘western’ forces chose to adopt the 155 mm calibre. The two 
calibres are broadly similar in capability; both are able to deliver a projectile of 
approximately 40 kg to ranges of 17-40 km. There are many different models of 
152/155 mm artillery guns; however this report focuses on models that have been 
widely used, or are currently being used, in conflict zones.
Photo 5. U.S. Army 155 mm M777 towed artillery gun in Iraq  
(photo credit: Defense Industry Daily).
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152 mm and 155 mm artillery guns form a staple in nearly all state armed forces 
of moderate size or larger. Non-state actors such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) in Iraq and Syria have captured artillery guns from conventional military 
forces and employed these in support of their own aims. ISIL is reported to have 
captured fifty-two 155 mm towed artillery systems provided by the U.S. military 
to the Iraqi Army, although some of these have since been recaptured by Kurdish 
forces or destroyed by coalition air strikes (Ernst, 2014).
For more information on 152 mm and 155 mm artillery guns, refer to Annex B.
81 MM, 82 MM & 120 MM MORTARS
Mortars are generally smoothbore, muzzle-loading, indirect fire weapons. Conven-
tional mortars do not have recoil mechanisms, with the main recoil force being 
transmitted directly to the ground via the baseplate. Additionally, most mortars 
are restricted in elevation, and are only capable of firing at high-angle trajectories 
(above 45°), meaning that they cannot be used in a direct fire support role. 66
Photo 6. French soldiers firing an 81 mm medium mortar, Mali  
(photo credit: http://gunrunnerhell.tumblr.com).
66 There are a small number of mortar systems which have uncommon features such as rifling, 
recoil mitigation systems, or which are breech-loaded and some mortars are capable of 
low-angle fire (Jenzen-Jones, 2015; Ryan, 1982).
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Mortar projectiles often impact the target at a very steep angle, making mortars 
ideal weapons for firing over, into, or out of defilade. Sometimes referred to as 
‘the poor man’s artillery’, they are simple to manufacture and operate, rugged, 
portable, cheap and versatile, although generally less accurate than artillery 
(Dullum et al., 2016).
There are a number of different designs in various calibres; this report highlights 
some of the most commonly encountered varieties of conventionally designed 
mortars; specifically 81 mm and 82 mm medium mortars, and 120 mm heavy 
mortars. Mortars are generally one of the most responsive of indirect fire weapons, 
capable of engaging targets quickly and at shorter ranges than many artillery 
guns or rocket systems. Generally speaking, medium mortars can fire at ranges 
of 100 m to 5500 m, while heavy mortars have a range of some 500 m to 7000 m 
(Gander & Hogg, 1993; Isby, 1988).
Mortars are found in the inventories of almost all state armed forces, and a majority 
of larger non-state armed groups. They are comparatively simple to operate and 
are employed frequently in current and recent conflict zones. A single 120 mm 
mortar projectile was fired into a market in the February 5, 1994 attack in Sarajevo, 
killing 68 and injuring approximately 144 civilians (Hansen, 2006; Allsop, 2012).
For more information on 81 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm mortars, refer to Annex C.
115 MM, 120 MM & 125 MM TANK GUNS
Photo 7. Russian Tank T-90MS-V firing its main gun (photo credit: Photobucket / bhenkz2).
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Tanks are mobile, armoured, heavy weapons platforms that have been used in the 
majority of conflicts since World War II. Tank guns differ from the other land based 
weapon systems detailed in this report by primarily employing direct fire; that is to 
say, when firing its main gun, the gunner can see the target and aims directly at it, 
rather than firing at an indirect trajectory. Although, due to technological advances, 
modern tanks far exceed the performance of their predecessors, simultaneous 
developments in anti-tank systems mean that most remain vulnerable to coun-
termeasures employed by both conventional military forces and non-state actors 
using asymmetric warfare techniques. This influences the employment tactics of 
modern tanks in contemporary conflict.
This report covers tank guns of 115 mm, 120 mm and 125 mm in calibre, 
which encompasses the majority of tanks guns that have been produced since 
1961, when the Soviet Union introduced the T-62 main battle tank (MBT). It is 
necessary to limit the scope of this study, and the increase of Soviet tank gun 
calibres from 100 mm to 120 mm in 1961 provides an appropriate cut-off point in 
time. Although the T-62 partially replaced the earlier T-55 model with its 100 mm 
main gun, T-55 tanks remain commonly encountered today. The majority of tank 
gun munitions employed by modern militaries are dual-purpose, designed to 
destroy enemy armoured fighting vehicles or structures, while also offering a 
fragmentation effect for use in an anti-personnel role. Tank guns of Russian design 
commonly use HE and HE-FRAG munitions.
Tanks often take on a high-profile role in modern conflicts. Capable of very high 
precision in their direct fire role, tanks have been involved extensively in attacks 
within populated areas. As an example, a bus in Chechnya containing displaced 
people was struck by a single tank projectile on 5 October 1999, resulting in 28 
deaths and 17 injuries (HRW, 1999).
For more information on 115 mm, 120 mm and 125 mm tank guns, refer to Annex D.
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MK 82 AIRCRAFT BOMB
Air-delivered munitions may provide the ability to destroy ground and naval targets 
without risking a large number of military personnel on the ground, even when 
operating deep within enemy territory. The Mk 82 aircraft bomb and its guided 
variants have been used extensively throughout the world and are one of the most 
common families of air-delivered munitions ever produced.
The Mk 82 and its variants are 500-pound (227 kg) class 67, low-drag, general-
purpose aircraft bombs containing 89 kg of high explosive. Originally dropped 
as an unguided bomb (sometimes referred to as an ‘iron’ or ‘dumb’ bomb), 
these versions of the Mk 82 exhibited a Circular Error Probable (CEP, explained in 
pp. 27-36 of 94.5 m when released from an altitude of 15000 ft. (4572 m).
Guided versions of the Mk 82, such as the GBU-12 and the GBU-49, now have 
a CEP of 1.1 m (Raytheon, 2006), indicating very high precision (see Figure 8). 
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the laser-guided GBU-12 was reported 
as striking its targets 88% of the time, with most targets being single vehicles 
67 Air-delivered bombs are often classified by weight, although this classification does not 
necessarily indicate the precise weight of the complete munition or its payload; rather, these 
are approximate weight ‘classes’ (Cross et al., 2016).
Photo 8. A Paveway II practice bomb being dropped from an F-35 aircraft  
(photo credit: U.S. Air Force).
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(Blackwelder, 1993). Although 12% of the targets were still missed, the introduction 
of PGM meant that targets could be destroyed with a relatively small and precise 
strike. This reduced the number of explosive weapons and munitions previously 
required to achieve the military objective and the number of aircraft needed to 
carry the munitions, reducing the risk of aircrew losses.
The Mk 82 has been used by the U.S. military and various other nations since 
the 1950s, and saw extensive deployment in South East Asia during the Vietnam 
War. 68 The Mk 82 remains relevant in current and recent conflicts. During the 
1991 Gulf War, more than 4,500 Mk 82 bombs configured as laser-guided GBU-12 
model PGM were used by the U.S. and its allies (Friedman, 1997). In 2016, various 
configurations of the Mk 82 were used in a number of countries and territories, 
including Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen (ARES, n.d.).
For more information on Mk 82 bombs and variants, refer to Annex E.
MUNITIONS’ EFFECTS COMPARISON
Comparative information on the characteristic high explosive munitions used 
by the studied weapon systems is presented in Table 9. The table provides key 
data relating to the high explosive payloads of a variety of HE and HE-FRAG 
munitions of differing design and origin, showing explosive fill weight, explosive 
fill as a percentage of the total munition weight, explosive composition, relative 
effectiveness (RE) factor and net explosive quantity (NEQ). 69 This table allows for 
a comparison of the relative energetic payloads delivered by each munition type. 
The RE factor is a measurement of an explosive's power for military, logistical, 
safety and other purposes. It is used to compare a given explosive compound's 
effectiveness relative to TNT 70 by weight. The definition of TNT equivalency is 
complex, as there are many experimental bases for comparison of explosives (heat, 
brisance, detonation velocity, etc.). For more information on relative effectiveness 
factors see, for example, Maienschein (2002).
68 More than 8.5 million Mk 82 bombs were dropped by the USAF in South East Asia during 
the period 1963-1973 (Berger, C. 1977).
69 NEQ describes the total explosives content of a particular munition (in this case, restricted 
to the warhead of the munition) (MoD, 2013).
70 Trinitrotoluene, a common type of military explosive.
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Munition Country of origin Make Model Total munition 
weight
Explosive fill 
weight
Explosive fill  
% of total weight
Explosive 
composition
RE 
factor
Net explosive 
quantity (NEQ)
Source
Mortar projectiles
81 mm United States American Ordnance M821 4.06 kg 0.72 kg 17.70 % Comp-B 72 1.33 0.96 kg U.S. Army, 2003
81 mm Bulgaria Arcus Co. AR-M81 4.15 kg 0.75 kg 18.10 % TNT 1.00 0.75 kg Arcus, n.d.
81 mm Serbia Krušik a.d. M72 3.05 kg 0.68 kg 22.20 % TNT 1.00 0.68 kg Krušik, n.d.
81 mm Bosnia  
& Herzegovina
Pretis d.d. M91 4.10 kg 0.85 kg 20.70 % Comp-B/TNT 1.33/1.00 1.13 kg/0.85 kg Pretis, n.d.
82 mm Bulgaria Arcus Co. VO-832DU 3.10 kg 0.40 kg 13.00 % TNT 1.00 0.40 kg Arcus, n.d.
82 mm Bulgaria Arsenal JSCo. HE 82M 3.10 kg 0.42 kg 13.50 % TNT 1.00 0.42 kg Arsenal, n.d.
82 mm Hungary Fort Hungary LLC HE-82LD 4.15 kg 0.75 kg 18.10 % TNT 1.00 0.75 kg Fort, n.d.
82 mm Bosnia  
& Herzegovina
Pretis d.d. M74 3.05 kg 0.68 kg 22.30 % TNT 1.00 0.68 kg Pretis, n.d.
120 mm Serbia Krušik a.d. M62P8 12.60 kg 2.45 kg 19.40 % Comp-B/TNT 1.33/1.00 3.26 kg/ 2.45 kg HK ‘Krušik’ a.d, n.d.
120 mm Belgium MECAR M530A1 15.20 kg 2.60 kg 17.10 % Comp-B 1.33 3.46 kg MECAR, n.d.
120 mm Norway Nammo AS 120 mm HE 13.00 kg 2.00 kg 15.40 % TNT 1.00 2.00 kg Nammo, 2016
120 mm Pakistan Pakistan Ordnance 
Factories
HEM44A2 13.00 kg 2.60 kg 20.00 % TNT 1.00 2.60 kg POF, n.d.(a)
120 mm Bosnia  
& Herzegovina
Pretis d.d. M62P3 12.60 kg 2.25 kg 17.90 % TNT 1.00 2.25 kg Pretis, n.d.
TABLE 9
 HIGH EXPLOSIVE PAYLOAD COMPARISON FOR SELECTED MUNITIONS
71 In some cases, RE factors are calculated to approximate equivalency, drawing on various 
sources. See Crawford & Dobratz, 1985; Maienschein, 2002; Pirospravka, 2012.
72 Composition B, a mixture of RDX and TNT.
 71
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Munition Country of origin Make Model Total munition 
weight
Explosive fill 
weight
Explosive fill  
% of total weight
Explosive 
composition
RE 
factor
Net explosive 
quantity (NEQ)
Source
Artillery rockets
122 mm Soviet Union 73 JSC ‘NPO’ Splav 9M22U 66.60 kg 6.40 kg 9.60 % TGAF-5 1.30 8.32 kg Splav, n.d.; 
Karpenko, 2010
122 mm Serbia Krušik a.d. GRAD-2000 68.30 kg 6.40 kg 9.40 % TGAF-5 equiv. 1.30 8.32 kg Krušik, n.d.
122 mm Romania Romarm 122 Rocket 65.00 kg 6.00 kg 9.20 % TGAF-5 equiv. 1.30 7.80 kg Tohan, n.d.
122 mm Pakistan Pakistan Ordnance 
Factory
Yarmuk HE 66.00 kg 6.00 kg 9.10% Comp-B 1.33 7.98 kg POF, n.d.(b)
122 mm Turkey Roketsan TR-122 65.90 kg 6.00 kg 74 9.10 % Comp-B 1.33 7.98 kg Roketsan, n.d.
Artillery projectiles
152 mm Russia JSC NIMI 3OF64 43.56 kg 7.80 kg 18.00 % A-IX-2 1.54 12.01 kg ICDTS 75, 2006; 
NIMI, n.d.
152 mm Soviet Union 76 JSC NIMI 3OF45 43.56 kg 7.65 kg 18.00 % A-IX-2 1.54 11.78 kg ICDTS 77, 2006.
152 mm Slovakia ZVS (MSM Group) 152 mm HE ER-HB 43.56 kg 8.10 kg 18.60 % TNT 1.00 8.10 kg ZVS, n.d.
152 mm Bosnia & Herzegovina Pretis d.d. OF-540 42.93 kg 5.85 kg 13.60 % TNT 1.00 5.85 kg Pretis, n.d.
155 mm Italy Simmel Difesa L15A1 43.50 kg 11.30 kg 25.00 % Comp-B/TNT 1.33/1.00 15.00/11.30 kg Nexter Group, n.d.
155 mm Italy Simmel Difesa M107 43.00 kg 6.98 kg 16.20 % TNT 1.00 6.98 kg Nexter Group, n.d.
155 mm Norway Nammo AS 155 mm HE-ER 44.40 kg 9.00 kg 20.00 % TNT/Comp-B 1.00/1.33 9.00/11.97 kg Nammo, 2016
155 mm United States American Ordnance M795 46.90 kg 10.79 kg 23.00 % TNT 1.00 10.79 kg American 
Ordnance, n.d.
155 mm India Indian Ordnance 
Factories
HE M/77B 42.60 kg 8.00 kg 18.80 % TNT 1.00 8.00 kg IOF, n.d.
73 Later produced in Russia.
74 Estimated. 
75 Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety.
76 Later produced in Russia.
77 Ibid.
82 | Five selected explosive weapon systems and their munitions Five selected explosive weapon systems and their munitions | 83
Munition Country of origin Make Model Total munition 
weight
Explosive fill 
weight
Explosive fill  
% of total weight
Explosive 
composition
RE 
factor
Net explosive 
quantity (NEQ)
Source
Tank gun projectiles
115 mm Soviet Union Various 3UOF37 17.82 kg 3.13 kg 17.60 % A-IX-2 1.54 4.82 kg ICDTS, 2006.
115 mm Egypt Heliopolis 
Company, Chemical 
Industries
3OF18 copy 17.86 kg 2.80 kg 15.70 % TNT 1.00 2.80 kg ICDTS, 2006.
120 mm France Nexter Munitions HE F1 16.00 kg 3.00 kg 18.70 % Comp-B 1.33 3.99 kg Nexter Group, n.d.
120 mm Norway Nammo AS IM HE-T 16.00 kg 3.20 kg 20.00 % OSX-8 1.30 4.16 kg Nammo, 2016
120 mm Israel Israeli Military 
Industries
HE-MP-T 120 M339 17.00 kg 2.70/3.00 kg 15.9/17.6 kg TNT/CLX663 1.00/? 2.70/- kg Schirding, 2011
125 mm Soviet Union 78 JSC NIMI 3OF26 23.00 kg 3.40 kg 14.80 % A-IX-2 1.54 5.24 kg ICDTS, 2006; NIMI, 
n.d.
125 mm Pakistan Pakistan Ordnance 
Factory
125 mm H.E.FS TK 34.15 kg 4.00 kg 11.70 % TNT 1.00 4.00 kg POF, n.d.(c)
125 mm Soviet Union Various 3OF19 23.00 kg 3.15 kg 13.70 % TNT 1.00 3.15 kg ICDTS, 2006.
125 mm Bosnia & Herzegovina Pretis d.d. M86 23.30 kg 3.15 kg 13.70 % Comp-B/TNT 1.33/1.00 4.19/3.15 Pretis, n.d.
Aircraft Bombs
500 lb United States Ordtech Industries Mk 82 241.00 kg 87.00 kg 36.10 % TNT 1.00 87.00 kg Ordtech, n.d.
500 lb Serbia Krušik a.d. FAB-250 M79 240.00 kg 105.00 kg 43.80 % TNT 1.00 105.00 kg Krušik, n.d.
500 lb Romania S.C. Mechanical 
Plant ‘Mija’
BM-250E 250.00 kg 97.00 kg 39.00 % TNT 1.00 97.00 kg Mija, n.d.
500 lb Pakistan Pakistan Ordnance 
Factory
AC 500 241.00 kg 90.00 kg 37.30 % Comp-B 1.33 119.70 kg POF, n.d.(d)
500 lb United States General Dynamics BLU-111 241.00 kg 87.00 kg 36.10 % PBXN-109 1.17 101.80 kg Ordtech, n.d.
78 Later produced in Russia.
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Table 9 is supported by Table 10, which gives sample risk estimate distances 
(RED) 79 for each of the five broad types of munitions studied. These figures are 
visually represented in Figure 19.
TABLE 10
 RISK ESTIMATE DISTANCES FOR SELECTED MUNITIONS
MUNITION TYPE RED 0.1 (M) RED 10 (M)
1 Medium calibre (81 mm / 82 mm) mortar projectile 80 175 m 80 m
2 Tank gun (120 mm) projectile 81 250 m 82 90 m 83
3 120 mm mortar projectile 84 400 m 100 m
4 Artillery gun (152 mm / 155 mm) projectile 85 450 m 125 m
5 122 mm artillery rocket 86 500 m 87 150 m 88
6 500 lb. class aircraft bomb 89 425 m 250 m
Sources: DoD, 2008; Karpenko, 2010; Locking, 2011; Maienschein, 2002; Pirospravka, 2012; U.S. Army, 
1997; 2011; USMC, 1998; 2009.
79 In U.S. military use, RED applies to combat only. Minimum safe distances (MSD) are  
used in training environments.
80 Calculated using M821 81 mm projectile.
81 Calculated using IM HE-T 120 mm projectile.
82 No RED data available; estimated.
83 No RED data available; estimated.
84 Calculated using M329A2 120 mm projectile. 
85 Calculated using M107 155 mm projectile. 
86 Calculated using 9M22U 122 mm rocket.
87 No RED data available; estimated.
88 No RED data available; estimated.
89 Calculated using Mk 82 aircraft bomb.
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RED are defined as the minimum distance friendly troops can approach the effects 
of friendly fire without suffering appreciable casualties of 0.1 per cent PI (one person 
in one thousand likely to be incapacitated; RED 0.1) or 10 per cent PI (one person 
in ten likely to be incapacitated; RED 10) (U.S. Army, 2007; 2011). The U.S. Army 
bases its lethal area calculations (and PI) on a prone male soldier in winter clothing 
being physically unable to respond to an assault for a 5-minute period after the 
attack (U.S. Army, 2006). Where RED figures were not available for given munitions, 
they have been estimated by comparing the net explosive quantity (NEQ), relative 
effectiveness (RE) factor, explosive fill type, dimensions and munition weight of a given 
munition with several similar munitions and calculating the average among them.
Figure 19. Comparative RED 10 (left) and RED 0.1 (right) for the six munitions outlined in Table 10 
(Source: ARES / GICHD).
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EFFECTS ANALYSIS
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This section provides an analysis of the various physical effects, practices in 
use and terminology of the studied explosive weapons. There are patterns 
emerging, presented later in the section Findings and Conclusion. The case 
studies quoted in this section exemplify explosive weapon use in recent and 
continuing conflicts, each demonstrating the use of one type of weapon 
in a populated area. The research team sought as much objective, publicly 
accessible data on the studied cases as possible to allow for open comparisons 
between case studies and the weapons used. 90 Forty case studies, selected 
from more than 100 produced in this project, are included in Annexes A through 
E of this report. These have been condensed to include only the information 
pertinent to this study.
In the majority of studies, the number of people killed and injured during these 
attacks is stated. These figures have been included, but they only offer one 
dimension of the situation, and should not be viewed as the sole metric for 
characterising the effects of the explosive weapons involved.
The medical terminology used to identify the exact nature of the wounds sustained 
has been omitted, on the grounds of brevity and verifiability. The analysis and 
classification of damage to infrastructure is more situational, and therefore more 
difficult to compare. In some cases, it was reported incompletely, or not at all. 
This should not be taken to mean that reporting organisations and media do not 
appreciate the importance of infrastructure damage, as it is highlighted where 
verifiable information could be included.
Table 11 on next page lists one case involving each explosive weapon system 
studied, selected to highlight the use and effects of the particular weapon. 
The five case studies cover the period from February 1994 to January 2015. 
Though illustrative of the potential impact of the weapon systems covered, 
they should not necessarily be perceived as typical, as all munitions effects are 
context-dependent due to the many variables inherent to the use of explosive 
weapons in populated areas.
90 Non-publicly accessible (closed source) information was excluded, as transparency was a 
requirement to appropriately contextualize traditional and social media discourse on these events.
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TABLE 11
 CASE STUDIES SELECTED FOR EACH EXPLOSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM
CASE STUDY WEAPON TYPE DATE LOCATION DEATHS INJURIES
A17 122 mm grad 24 Jan 2015 Mariupol, 
Ukraine
29 ~93
B4 152 mm artillery 16 Aug 2012 Aleppo, Syria 60 79
C1 120 mm mortar 05 Feb 1994 Sarajevo, BiH 68 144
D5 120 mm tank gun 20 Jul 2014 Ash Shijaiyah, 
Gaza City
65 ~100
E1 227 kg guided 
Mk 82 91
05 Apr 2003 Basra, Iraq 17 5
EFFECTS ON STRUCTURES
The use of explosive weapons in populated areas can have a profound effect on 
physical structures such as vehicles, housing, commercial property, factories, 
school, hospitals etc. Consequently, though it might be an intuitive response of 
persons perceiving an explosive threat, seeking shelter in vehicles, houses and 
cellars is extremely risky. Whilst such structures offer some protection from the 
primary fragmentation effects of explosive weapons, they are also a source of 
debris and secondary fragmentation, such as shards of window glass or concrete, 
metal rods, plumbing pipes, or marble from the facades of modern buildings. Case 
study A13 includes an unverified doctor’s report that all 14 survivors out of 21 total 
casualties presented evidence of injuries from secondary fragmentation. Secondary 
fragmentation injuries from window glass are a common occurrence; for example, 
they accounted for 88% of the total injuries suffered by survivors of the Khobar 
Towers bombing in 1996 (Thompson, Brown, Mallonee, & Sunshine, 2004).
Moreover, if there is enough explosive force applied to compromise the structural 
integrity of a building, the latter will collapse, crushing those people who took 
shelter inside it. The 24 July 2014 case study from Beit Hanoun, Gaza (D2), 
demonstrates the effects of several 120 mm tank projectiles fired at a school. 
Similarly, the 20 July 2014 case study from Ash Shijaiyah, Gaza (D5), and Deir el 
Balah, also Gaza (D1), covered multiple tank gun projectiles fired into residential 
areas, including Al Aqsa Martyrs Hospital. In both cases, it was necessary to 
extract civilian casualties from collapsed buildings.
91 Specific Mk 82 model is not known.
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Although no data was available for the structural design, construction techniques 
and materials concerning the structurally compromised buildings, it is worth noting 
that multi-purpose tank munitions are often designed to penetrate structures 
before delivering their effects. This can lead to munitions penetrating multiple 
rooms, or destroying structural elements in buildings that may otherwise be 
expected to be more resistant to explosive weapons, such as steel girders and 
foundations.
The effects of an explosive weapon used in one populated environment may be 
very different in another area, depending on the building design, engineering 
and materials. There appears to be insufficient data on the subject and therefore 
more research is necessary to explore what effect explosive weapons might have 
on populated areas characterised by buildings built with different materials and 
according to different standards.
EFFECTS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Some illustrative examples of damage to critical infrastructure, such as electrical 
and water supply systems, and economically vital businesses can be seen in case 
studies A8 (1 February 2014, in Al Kufrah, Libya) in an attack on the Sarir Power 
Station, and in case study A5 (31 July 2011, Misrata, Libya) on the Al-Naseem 
Dairy. Both these attacks were carried out using BM-21 type MBRL systems and 
had a significant broad impact. The damage to the Sarir power station caused 
power cuts in Tripoli and Benghazi and the attack on the dairy forced the closure 
of the largest private employer in the country, with 750 jobs lost. The estimated 
costs to restart production at the dairy were in excess of US$ 20 million.
The 23 January 2015 case study from Mosul, Iraq (A16), examining an attack 
that damaged a water sterilisation plant, presents an example of how a critical 
infrastructure object can be impacted by explosive weapons, causing subsequent 
civilian casualties. Primary and secondary explosive weapon effects on the water 
sterilisation plant resulted in the release of a cloud of toxic chlorine gas, which 
went on to kill an unspecified number of people. In this case, both artillery guns 
and rocket launchers were used, and it is not possible conclusively to define the 
roles of each weapon system in causing the damage.
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EFFECTS IN ENCLOSED URBAN SPACES
When explosive munitions detonate in a populated and urban environment, the 
reflected blast waves, coupled with primary and secondary fragmentation, can 
cause very high casualties. The 5 February 1994 attack on Markale, Sarajevo 
(C1), is an example of the potentially devastating effect of explosive weapons in 
an enclosed or semi-enclosed public space. A single 120 mm mortar projectile 
fell into a crowded market in Sarajevo, in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
killing 68 people and injuring an additional 144. This is a rather unusual event, as 
a single HE mortar projectile is unlikely to cause so many casualties. There is a 
lack of information regarding the specific nature of the injuries.
However, in a second attack on the same location the following year (C2), doctors 
reported a large number of brain injuries. This type of trauma would be consistent 
with injuries caused by blast waves. The market place itself is relatively small, 
and surrounded by tall buildings. This would have had the effect of reflecting the 
energy of the blast wave back into the crowd of people, thus amplifying the overall 
impact. Had this attack occurred in the open, it is highly unlikely that so many 
people would have been killed or injured.
In line with Israeli research into the effects of attacks on buses, a 5 October 
1999 case study from Chechnya, Russia (D4), shows the increased lethal effect 
of explosions in, or near, enclosed vehicles. 92 From the case study, it is notable 
that a single tank projectile is thought to have caused 28 deaths and 17 injuries, 
when it detonated inside a bus.
This effect occurs with other explosive weapon types, and is not necessarily 
limited to munitions which explode inside the vehicle. In the 13 January 2015 case 
study from Volnovakha, Ukraine (A12), one 122 mm rocket detonated close to a 
bus, killing 12 and injuring 17. The impact point of the rocket was approximately 
10 m away from the bus, but the pattern of lethality is consistent with the Israeli 
research, and with the tank projectile case studies.
Based on the injury patterns, it is most probable that the large number of casualties 
caused by a single projectile is a result of the reflection of the blast wave inside 
the bus, followed by primary and secondary fragmentation and crushing debris 
in the confined space. A similar effect would occur if a projectile detonated inside 
the room of a house, or any other similar enclosed space.
92 It should be noted that the attacks that were studied involved IEDs, rather than conventional 
high explosive weapons, which would have different patterns and types of fragmentation 
(Leibovici et al., 1996).
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For larger explosive munitions, such as Mk 82 aircraft bomb variants, enclosed 
spaces can be a series of interconnected spaces, or even entire buildings. 
The intensification of the primary effect is mainly due to the reflection of the blast 
wave, but also because of secondary fragmentation. This will result in a higher 
proportion of fatalities than would be likely in open spaces.
EFFECTS IN OPEN URBAN SPACES
Where crowds of people have been caught outside without warning or cover, the 
effects of munitions in populated areas are substantial. In these instances, a single 
munition can cause a large number of deaths, as can be seen in the 16 August 
2012 case study from Aleppo City, Syria (B4), when 60 people were killed and 79 
injured while they were queuing for bread.
Whilst significant casualties are often seen as a result of munitions which strike 
enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces, case study E3 represented an exceptionally 
high casualty rate despite the open nature of the strike site. Three GBU-12 (Mk 82) 
precision guided munitions were dropped in Majer, Libya, destroying three houses, 
resulting in 16 deaths and 23 injuries. The houses were partially reduced to rubble, 
which was being searched for survivors when another bomb was dropped some 
10-20 minutes later. The final bomb proved to be more lethal than the previous 
three munitions combined, killing another 18, and injuring 15.
Whereas the primary effects of the Mk 82 could have caused all deaths, the 
initial three bombs had a 41% lethality rate, with a total of 14 killed, while the 
final bomb had a 55% lethality rate, with 18 killed. Although precise medical 
information was not available in this instance, it is unlikely that the blast effect of 
the Mk 82 was more lethal in open air, even considering the significant effects 
of primary fragmentation as part of its total effects. It is possible that secondary 
fragmentation was a significant contributing factor to the lethality of the bomb in 
this instance or that there was a high concentration of people in the vicinity trying 
to rescue those affected by the earlier bombs.
EFFECTS DUE TO TARGETING
There are undoubtedly limitations on accuracy and precision placed upon the use 
of explosive weapons in indirect fire in particular. Such limitations can be due to 
lack of training or access to advanced technology, old weapons and inconsistent 
munitions, and bad weather for example. However, the research found several 
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examples (cases A2, A3, A12, A15, A16, A17, B5), in recent and ongoing conflicts 
where explosive weapons appeared to be targeted and used en masse, over an 
area, without this resulting in a clear military objective being achieved. Therefore, 
when examining causality of harmful effects in populated area, it is important not 
to mix issues pertinent to targeting with those related to accuracy and precision.
EFFECTS DUE TO HIGH EXPLOSIVE YIELD IN MUNITION
Some munitions pose particular targeting concerns. A single Mk 82, for example, 
contains 89 kg of high explosive. It creates a tremendously powerful blast, 
making collateral damage mitigation measures a complex task in a populated 
area. Owing to the powerful blast wave it produces, it can destroy reinforced 
concrete structures within 16 m of the point of detonation, and will easily flatten 
the houses and apartment buildings that civilians inhabit. Non-reinforced buildings 
offer almost no protection from a direct hit from a Mk 82. This is clear from the 
5 April 2003 case study from Al-Tuwaisi, Basra (E1), when an attempt was made 
to kill a high-value individual in his house. The house was destroyed, but so were 
the houses on either side, killing 17 people and injuring another 5.
Figure 20. Butterfly-shaped pattern of the blast and fragmentation effects of a typical 227 kg 
(500 lb) HE aircraft bomb. The red area measuring approx. 32 m (from left to right) indicates 
100% lethality: a preliminary result of the explosive weapon effects modelling software 
being developed under this project (source: Fraunhofer-EMI).
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ACKNOWLEDGING WIDE AREA EFFECTS
The use and acquisition of munitions may be changing in response to the 
challenges of employing explosive weapons in populated areas. For example, 
the fact that variants 93 of the Mk 82, one of the smallest 94 guided bomb units in 
NATO’s inventory, are used so often in preference to the larger Mk 83 (454 kg) and 
the Mk 84 (907 kg), suggests increasing awareness of the substantial area effects 
of explosive weapons. The development of new bombs such as the BLU-126/B 
Low Collateral Damage Bomb and the BLU-129/B Very Low Collateral Damage 
Weapon may also imply a change in military doctrine of good tactical use of 
air-launched weapons, testifying to attempts better to control and reduce wide 
area effects by providing more appropriate tools in support of targeting policies 
(see Weapon-target matching, p. 65).
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
The most modern artillery systems can achieve remarkable accuracy at all ranges, 
but many forces most likely to be using artillery guns in populated areas will 
also tend to use older designs, which often cannot achieve the same levels of 
accuracy. In some cases, adjusting fire techniques are employed. This means that 
a single round (sometimes a practice round or other less-lethal type) is fired, its 
impact point recorded, and adjustments made, before a second round is fired. This 
continues until the rounds are impacting exactly where the observer wants them 
to go. The rounds are ’walked‘ onto the target. Military forces often ‘register’ their 
guns in advance, and deliberately adjust fire in designated zones. However, in the 
case of some forces, this procedure will take place within populated areas, using 
one or more HE projectiles. Multiple rounds will fail to impact the target area, and 
will pose a threat to civilians and civilian objects (Dullum et al., 2016).
The Aleppo City study (B4) is particularly illustrative of how indirect fire can be 
‘walked’ on to a target to achieve a precise strike, alas in a manner which adversely 
impacts civilians. Witnesses observed a fired artillery projectile strike near a Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) facility. After a few minutes this was followed by another two 
projectiles striking apartment buildings nearby, close to a local bakery, followed 
by a fourth and final projectile which struck ‘a few metres from the breadline, 
where several hundred people were waiting in line’ (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
93 The Small Diameter Bomb (GBU-39, 110 kg), for example, entered into service in 2006 
(Boeing, 2012).
94 Mk 82 weighs 227 kg, including approximately 89 kg of high explosive.
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It is important to note that if the intended target of the artillery was indeed the 
bakery, then an observer would likely have advised the artillery gun crews of the 
impact locations of the first three projectiles in order to compensate for bias, 
‘walking’ the fire to the target.
Another example of employment practices concerns tactics of use of indirect fire 
en masse, prevalent in a number of case studies. Military doctrines for mortars, 
artillery rockets and field artillery in particular continue to encourage en masse 
delivery of indirect fire, with an objective to achieve maximum concentration 
of the effects on an area at a given time (Dullum, 2010). Such tactics, and 
explosive weapons, were developed in an era when precision of weapons and 
consistency of munitions were unattainable and not a characteristic requirement. 
It allowed compensating for their poor accuracy and precision, de facto using 
the area weapons in the very function they were designed for (Dullum, 2010). 
However, technological developments in the past decades have introduced higher 
precision and accuracy characteristics for many explosive weapon systems; 
military objectives can be achieved with fewer munitions fired yet delivering the 
desired effects. The suitability of use of indirect fire en masse therefore, in certain 
scenarios such as in populated areas, is questionable and a review of standing 
military doctrines should be considered.
As noted earlier, the 122 mm BM-21 MBRL was not designed to be a precision 
weapon. With its powerful warhead and the common practice of firing a barrage 
of rockets from one or more launch platforms, the effects of this system are not 
confined to a small area. Multiple rockets were fired in the following case studies: 
A2 to A5, A7 to A17, A19 and A20.
In some cases, such as the 24 January 2015 attack in Mariupol, Ukraine (A17), 
it is difficult to differentiate between different rocket artillery systems employed in 
the same attack. According to the Mariupol City Council, multiple BM-21 systems 
fired their full complement of rockets, and the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reported that 
the BM-27 Uragan 220 mm MBRL was also used in this attack. It is not surprising, 
given the similarities between systems and areas of overlapping effects, that the 
damage was not distinguishable between the two rocket artillery systems from 
the limited public data.
On the other hand, most modern tank guns are able to achieve remarkable accu-
racy and precision, relative to the other unguided weapon systems covered in 
this report. When tank guns cause harm to civilians and civilian objects, it is 
more often a result of the manner in which they are employed, and the targets 
against which they are used, i.e. as a result of target selection, identification and 
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engagement practices. This has been largely driven by the need for a ‘one shot, 
one kill’ weapon platform that can neutralise an enemy tank before it has the 
opportunity to respond and neutralise the attacker.
However, if a tank were to miss its target with its main gun, the projectiles may 
have sufficient kinetic energy to continue for several kilometres beyond their 
intended target, potentially placing civilians and civilian objects at risk when 
employed in, or near populated areas.
115–125 mm HE projectiles 95 are powerful explosive munitions with a wide area 
effect. An accurate hit in the centre of the intended target will still affect the area 
around the target and may cause collateral harm if improperly employed. Some 
tank projectiles have been designed with multiple fuze settings, including delay 
functions which can be set to function very shortly after impact, with the specific 
intention of detonating the projectile inside the target.
An analysis of the relative explosive quantity (expressed by NEQ), fragmentation 
weight and expected patterns, and RED figures for each of the five types 
of weapon system assessed in this report clearly illustrate how the design-
dependent precision and effects of these weapons vary. As anticipated, with 
an NEQ of at least 87 kg, the Mk 82 aerial bomb is the single most destructive 
munition studied herein. However, as discussed, Mk 82 series munitions are 
now generally employed as part of a PGM, greatly enhancing delivery accuracy. 
By way of contrast, the 9M22U 122 mm rocket has an NEQ of less than 8.5 kg. 
Nonetheless, significant fragmentation generated from the pre-fragmented and 
partially pre-fragmented munitions casing combined with an imprecise delivery 
system result in a relatively high RED.
FUZE SELECTION
The vast majority of HE munitions are fitted with point-detonating fuzes, which 
are designed to detonate on impact. This is especially the case when mortar 
projectiles are being fired at targets that are protected, such as trenches or 
bunkers. In addition to the spread of fragmentation, the shockwave will travel 
through the ground or structure. Evidence gathered from the craters at the 
Markale market (case studies C1 and C2) indicates that the projectiles used 
were fitted with point-detonating fuzes. The angle of fall, estimated at 60-65°, 
95 Includes multi-purpose munitions, or High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), which is the most 
common type of tank munition deployed internationally (Defense Update, 2004).
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would place the estimate for the lethal area at between 290-380 m2 (ICTFFY, 2003). 
This would mean that up to 38% of the market’s area was within the lethal area of 
the warhead, without considering primary fragmentation and secondary effects. 
The increased lethality of the resulting explosion in an enclosed or semi-enclosed 
area explains the number of casualties caused by the attacks.
Photo 9. Structural damage caused by explosive munitions in the northern Gaza Strip, 
August 2014 (photo credit: APA Images).
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AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY
As noted, less advanced weapon systems, munitions and fire control systems 
may require additional projectiles to be fired to establish an impact point, so that 
adjustments can be made to hit the required target. If more advanced laser or 
GPS-guided munitions (PGM) were used instead, indirect fire weapon systems 
would become more accurate and precise. However, such PGM are currently 
expensive, and will not be replacing unguided munitions in the foreseeable future.
Standardisation and quality control of available conventional munitions should 
also be taken into account. The BM-21 is a good example of a weapon system 
that has been widely copied. As a result, there are notable inconsistencies in the 
rocket materials, the engineering of components and assembly, and in storage 
environments, which may further compromise the weapon’s accuracy and 
precision. Rockets that have been manufactured under less than ideal conditions, 
or in environments without adequate quality control, may be less accurate than 
those produced in advanced facilities.
The availability of weapon systems of varying levels of technological advancement 
directly impacts the effects of those systems in populated areas. For example, when 
examining the impact of tank guns, it is important to consider the wide range of 
battle tanks in service around the world. Some modern military doctrines have 
diminished the role of tanks, particularly in urban environments where they can 
be more vulnerable to developments in anti-tank technology. Some militaries, for 
their part, continue to use older generation tanks and technology because those are 
what they can afford and have access to. Such older tank systems may be readily 
available on the market at a fraction of the cost compared to a modern system. This 
has led to a proportional increase in the number of older generation tanks deployed 
in conflict zones. The use of older tanks can be seen in the 18 March 2011 case study 
from Central Misrata, Libya (D3), where second generation tanks such as the T-72 
were used. As the tanks currently fielded by militaries in certain countries continue 
to age, the precision of these tanks may decline, as maintenance and replacement 
guidelines may not be adhered to. Their performance will be significantly less precise 
than that of the newer generation III or IV Merkava tank, or the third generation T-90 
tanks currently being fielded by other militaries (D1, D2, D5).
Similarly, the information presented in this report with regard to the accuracy of 
122 mm BM-21 type MBRL refers primarily to the original and improved Russian 
designs. These figures and tables should not be used as a benchmark for the 
less-advanced BM-21 variants. More advanced variants may be capable of greater 
precision and accuracy, but there are technical limits to what can be achieved by 
unguided rockets fired from this type of system, particularly when fired en masse.
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PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS
Modern warfare is frequently asymmetric, where a professional military force 
fights against an insurgency with only a very limited ability to wage a conventional 
war. This often sees belligerents on one side dispersed among the local population. 
Precision guided munitions (PGM), combined with real-time intelligence from 
various sources, including advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), allow a 
small number of military forces to strike targets accurately in populated areas 
and, depending on the specific weapon’s explosive yield, and other factors 
considered in this report, may reduce the likelihood of causing civilian casualties 
or significant damage to civilian objects. However, precision guidance does not 
obviate a munition’s wide area effects. It is important to stress this point, as the 
modern usage of the Mk 82 aircraft bomb with a comparatively high explosive 
yield (89 kg) sees them deployed as PGM.
Moreover, though none of the Mk 82 case studies which all employ PGM 
demonstrated inaccuracy of the weapon system, civilian casualties caused in 
these cases typically resulted from poor intelligence and targeting. Therefore, 
while the destructive effect of the Mk 82 can manifest itself in significant collateral 
damage, as seen in case study E1, this should not necessarily be interpreted as an 
indication of a failure in accuracy.
The negative impact of poor intelligence is evident in the 4 September 2009 
case study from Amerkheil, Kunduz, Afghanistan (E2), in which two fuel tankers 
hijacked by Taliban militants became bogged down. An Afghan informant 
incorrectly asserted that the hundreds of civilians who had come to siphon fuel 
from the tankers were all militants, and they were subsequently targeted by two 
GBU-38 PGMs delivered by a NATO F-16, killing 142. It is likely that the presence of 
the flammable material and secondary fragmentation from the tankers contributed 
to the large number of civilian deaths.
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MULTI BARREL ROCKET LAUNCHERS
MBRL systems have specific considerations and limitations that should be 
addressed. The MBRL was designed to produce a wide area of effect, as opposed 
to striking precise targets. When an MBRL such as the 122 mm BM-21 fires rockets 
at a range of approximately 14 km in close to ideal conditions (i.e. in even terrain, 
with good weather conditions, a trained crew and an appropriate target profile, 
calculations and firing tables), each rocket still has a probable error of 100 m in 
range, meaning it could land as far as 100 m beyond the target, or 100 m before it.
The rocket also has a probable error of 80 m in deflection, which means that it 
could land 80 m to the left, or 80 m to the right of its aiming point. When the 
BM-21 is fired at that range, then there is an elliptical probable error such that 
50% of rockets fired will land somewhere in an ellipse measuring approximately 
200 x 160 m. At 20 km, this increases to an ellipse measuring approximately 
600 x 320 m. At a range of 20 km, a full salvo of 40 BM-21 rockets would create 
a lethal area of up to 600 x 600 m, which goes some way to explaining the 
dispersion patterns evident in the case studies.
The system lacks both precision and accuracy, dispersing munitions over a 
significant lethal radius. It is possible to aim at a single point inside a populated 
area, but multiple rockets are required for a statistically probable chance to deliver 
the desired destructive effects to the target. Without advanced guidance systems, 
the attacker has very few technical means to reduce, or limit, the damage around 
the approximate target area. These characteristics suggest that 122 mm BM-21 
type MBRL and other MBRL with similar characteristics are unsuitable for use in 
populated areas.
Even a single rocket can cause significant numbers of casualties, as can be seen 
in the 14 April 2011 case study from Misrata, Libya (A4). In this case, one of 
six rockets fired killed ten people as they waited in line for bread. Similarly, in a 
case study from 14 October 2014 in Sartana, Ukraine (A13), seven people in a 
funeral procession were killed and another fourteen wounded by a single rocket. 
The other three rockets fired in the attack caused no casualties. As there are so 
many instances of single rockets causing multiple casualties, there can be no 
doubt as to the lethality of these warheads, even when they are not deployed 
en masse. When it is not clear where the rockets will impact, it also shows that 
the extent of destruction and the number of potential civilian casualties is difficult 
if not impossible to predict with sufficient accuracy. Consequently, without that 
accuracy in prediction, a realistic collateral damage estimate would have to come 
up with a very large impact area.
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Photo 10. Buildings destroyed by bombing on July 20, 2006, Beirut, Lebanon  
(photo credit: Sadik Gulec / Shutterstock.com)
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
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This report examined the characteristics of five explosive weapon systems 
encountered in contemporary conflicts in built and populated environments. 
The research compiled case studies to analyse the selected weapon systems and 
demonstrated prevailing practices in their use and their effects on humans and 
structures. Information to support the research was drawn from the case studies, 
external publications and expert interviews, with the objective of understanding 
and advancing knowledge on key characteristics of these weapons. On the 
basis of this analysis, the report draws findings on their accuracy and precision, 
multitude of immediate effects, and practices in their use, as follows:
1. Inherent accuracy and precision of the studied 
explosive weapon systems
1.1 The level of accuracy and precision of the studied explosive weapon 
systems differ significantly, with tank guns and guided aircraft bombs being 
capable of use in an accurate and precise direct fire function. However, their 
potential effects will be influenced by a given munition’s explosive yield, i.e. 
A precision guided Mk 82 bomb may still retain a wide area effect due to 
its tremendous power.
1.2 Modern versions of artillery guns and mortars are capable of a relatively 
high level of accuracy in an indirect fire role within their effective ranges. 
However, due to design-dependent low precision of these systems, 
projectiles generally spread over a sizable area which increases as the 
distance to the target increases. This limits their technical suitability for 
use against smaller or moving targets, especially in populated areas. Most 
indirect fire weapon systems used in today’s conflicts are incapable of 
achieving the high degree of accuracy required to hit a small point target 
with the first round.
1.3 Unguided artillery rockets are neither accurate, nor precise. Owing to its 
design as an area weapon, at maximum range the studied 122 mm BM-21 
multi barrel rocket launcher could not reliably impact an area smaller than 
600 x 320 m, within which humans and structures will be impacted.
1.4 Most Mk 82 aircraft bombs found in contemporary conflicts are guided 
versions. Precision guidance systems fitted to the Mk 82 can increase 
its accuracy from well above 100 m CEP to less than 5 m CEP in most 
weather conditions. However, accurately and precisely striking a target with 
a large munition such as a 227 kg (500 lb.) class bomb does not obviate its 
significant area effects and potential impact on civilians and civilian objects.
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1.5 The level of accuracy and precision can be unpredictable and inconsistent 
with any of the weapon systems studied owing to factors such as the design 
of the weapon system in question, level of operator training, alignment 
and sighting of the weapon, the quality control of munitions, weapon 
maintenance and the practical experience of the firer in using the weapon in 
varying terrain and weather conditions. Old designs of the weapon systems, 
as well as munitions that are past their effective shelf life, continue to be 
employed in conflicts by crews with limited or otherwise inadequate training 
on their operation, resulting in poor accuracy and precision.
2. Effects of high explosive munitions in populated areas
2.1 The main effects of high explosive munitions comprise blast, heat and frag-
mentation originating from the munition, plus the secondary fragmentation 
and debris generated in the impact, or explosion of the munition, travelling 
at high velocity to considerable distance. These effects are compounded 
by firing a salvo of munitions simultaneously or sequentially and by their 
use in populated areas, which often results in large areas experiencing 
significant damage, as opposed to damage to a cluster of unconnected and 
localised points.
2.2 The effects of high explosive munitions within populated areas are influenced 
substantially by the presence of built structures and geographical features. 
Structures may provide protection from primary and secondary explosive 
weapon effects, but also amplify these effects due to the channelling and 
reflection of blast waves. Buildings and vehicles may contribute bricks, 
concrete, glass and other debris to the fragmentation originating from the 
weapon. Any fuel sources (liquid and gas) or toxic chemicals within the 
munition’s impact zone may pose a further hazard to humans, as does the 
compromised structural stability of buildings which may be prone to collapse.
2.3 The intuitive reflex among humans to seek shelter from an explosive weapon 
attack in buildings, vehicles and similar enclosed spaces poses a lethal 
risk. The intensification of the weapon effects in a populated area is mainly 
due to the reflecting blast waves and presence of a number of people and 
structures within the amplified effective range of a munition(s), as well as 
sources of secondary fragmentation. This results in a higher proportion of 
fatalities than would be likely in open spaces.
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2.4 Humans are particularly vulnerable to blast overpressure and reflected blast 
waves. Surviving an explosive weapon attack with only surface bruises 
visible does not exclude ruptured eardrums, damaged lungs, internal 
bleeding, brain damage, infections and poisoning, and bone fracturing. 
Depending on the layout of structures in a populated area and type of an 
explosive weapon used in an attack, the probability of survival for a human 
may indeed increase when away from the proximity of structures (prone 
on the ground in a small depression or narrow ditch).
2.5 Mk 82 aircraft bombs and 122 mm rockets were found to have the widest 
area effect in the study, although mortar and artillery projectiles were 
both responsible for single-munition explosions resulting in double-figure 
casualties. Tank munitions were often found to have a more limited lethal 
area. Explosive weapon systems such as the 122 mm BM-21 multi barrel 
rocket launcher produce design-dependent effects intended to cause 
widespread destruction.
2.6 Given regional differences observed regarding structural design and build-
ing materials, more technical research is needed to characterise explosive 
weapon effects in different target environments. For example, the signifi-
cance of sources of debris in different populated areas and the implications 
of the presence of secondary hazards including but not limited to chemicals, 
have not yet been adequately researched.
3. Characteristic use of explosive weapons and measures 
to control their impact
3.1 As a general rule, armed forces should possess in-depth knowledge of the 
dynamic effects of the weapon systems and munitions in their inventories 
and should be able to accurately predict the extent of these effects in open 
terrain. However, our research suggests that there is less awareness of the 
effects of use in built-up areas, especially with regard to reflecting blast and 
sources of secondary fragmentation and debris. Whilst some militaries have 
the capability to model these hazards, this is far from common and carries 
limitations in terms of its ability to mimic reality accurately.
3.2 There are ways to mitigate the wide area effects of explosive weapons. 
Competent target analysis and approval procedure, positive target 
identification, evaluation of the vulnerabilities in the immediate physical 
environment, and selection of the most accurate and precise weapon 
available to the user are key factors in considering the wide area effects. 
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These factors guide the decisions over the method of employment 96, timing 
of the attack and weapon-target matching activities and assist in reducing 
collateral harm.
3.3 Weapon-target matching activities such as adjusting the time, angle and 
method of attack; fuze and munition selection and configuration; and 
delivery system optimisation, are critical in helping to reduce collateral 
harm. Weapon-target matching has limitations, however, pertinent to 
design-dependent characteristics of the explosive weapon that influence 
the accuracy, precision and the lethal effects of a given munition.
3.4 Conversely, weapon-target matching activities were found to be used in 
some cases to enhance the blast and fragmentation effects of an explosive 
weapon by fitting the munition with a proximity or time fuze set to deliver 
an airburst effect. Airburst employment of a conventional high explosive 
munition can increase its area effect by up to 100%. In a densely populated 
area this has the potential to significantly increase civilian harm.
3.5 Mortar and artillery systems continue to be ’walked on‘ to the target using 
the method of observing the impact location and thereafter correcting the 
aim. The first projectiles often impact areas outside the intended target. 
In order to maximise accuracy and precision during such procedures, 
extensive training, frequent weapon testing, access to modern technologies 
and detailed intelligence are paramount, supported by robust targeting 
policies and comprehensive and competent collateral damage estimates.
In conclusion, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has resulted in 
numerous civilian deaths and injuries. In addition to the human cost, the case studies 
confirm substantial damage to essential infrastructure, homes and businesses. 
The effects of the detonation of high explosive munitions are intensified when this 
occurs in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces such as buildings, tunnels, narrow 
streets or vehicles. This will result in a higher proportion of fatalities than would 
be likely in open spaces. In line with UNIDIR’s recent findings 97, this report calls 
for research to better understand, quantify and prepare for the various effects of 
secondary fragmentation, debris and other potentially deadly sources of hazard in 
populated areas.
96 i.e. direct, indirect or air-delivered fire. 
97 Reverberating Effects of Explosive Force (Wille & Borrie, 2016).
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The report also notes that a lack of standardised terms to describe arms and muni tions 
and their effects in populated areas is an ongoing impediment to characterising 
explosive weapons accurately. More coherent use of terminology by news media, 
civil society organisations, policymakers and military would help in accomplishing 
a greater harmony in the collection and analysis of data, and consistency in 
reporting on explosive weapons events.
Finally, achieving a high degree of accuracy and precision with any of the studied 
explosive weapon systems does not negate their wide area effects. These are 
further amplified when firing them en masse – an indirect fire doctrine that 
continues to be practised in many armed forces today. Firing explosive weapon 
systems en masse follows century-old military tactics aimed at ensuring maximum 
coverage of the weapon effects over an area, while compensating for poor accuracy 
and precision. Such tactics, and explosive weapons, were developed in an era 
when precision of weapons and consistency of munitions were unattainable, and 
not a characteristic requirement. Whereas the use of indirect fire en masse is still 
a highly effective method for a quick delivery of lethal power to incapacitate an 
area target, considering the presence of civilians and civilian objects, this method 
is unsuitable for populated areas.
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TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Abandoned 
explosive 
ordnance (AXO)
Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an 
armed conflict, a military exercise, or on a firing range, 
that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an 
armed conflict, or its owners, and which is no longer 
under control of the party that left it behind or dumped 
it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not 
have been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared 
for use.
CCW V 
& IATG 
Mod.
Aircraft bomb Explosive munition, not subject to centrifugal forces 
and with a nearly vertical angle of descent delivered 
from an aircraft.
IATG
Ammunition A complete device (e.g. missile, shell, mine, demolition 
store etc.) charged with explosives, propellants, 
pyrotechnics, initiating composition or nuclear, 
biological or chemical material for use in connection 
with offence, or defence, or training, or non-operational 
purposes, including those parts of weapons systems 
containing explosives.
JSP 482
Area 
bombardment
An attack on an area rather than on one specific 
target by one or a number of weapons firing several 
projectiles into that area. Bombing of a group of targets 
constituting an area rather than a pinpoint target.
AAP-6 
Mod.
Area effects The magnitude sum of primary (i.e. blast, heat, 
fragmentation) and secondary (i.e. fragmentation, debris, 
burns, toxicity) explosive weapon effects on humans, 
including structural damage and collapse, radiating from 
the impact location(s) of one or more munitions.
CEW
Area target A target consisting of an area rather than a single point. AAP-6
Arm To make a fuzing system ready for functioning by 
removal of all the safety constraints, thus permitting 
the munition to function on receipt of a specified 
firing stimulus.
JSP 482
* The key to source acronyms can be found at the end of the table.
*
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TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Artillery 
munitions
Medium and large-calibre munitions for artillery 
weapons, such as guns, howitzers, cannons, missile 
and rocket launchers, that are primarily designed to fire 
indirectly at targets.
CEW
Artillery gun A gun of a calibre greater than 57 mm, which is not 
man-portable, is designed for indirect fire and capable 
of hitting targets at a considerable range. Characterised 
by a heavy barrel, generally several metres long and 
most commonly fitted to a self-propelled vehicle or 
a towed trailer. Modern artillery guns feature recoil 
mechanisms, and many are capable of being used 
in the direct fire role. Includes ‘howitzers’, which are 
generally understood to be comparatively short-range 
artillery guns firing a heavy projectile at a relatively low 
muzzle velocity.
ARES
Assembly area 
(civilian)
Any location where groups of people gather on a regular 
basis for various commercial, social, educational, 
religious, administrative or commuting purposes.
CEW
Assembly place A place or building where it is customary for members 
of the public to assemble, e.g. church, school, sports 
stadium.
JSP 482
Barrage For the purposes of CEW, barrage refers to an explosive 
weapon attack of a minimum of 8 projectiles of the 
same type impacting one (target) area. For example, 
4 guns firing 2 rounds each.
Fire, which is designed to fill a volume of space or area 
rather than aimed specifically at a given target.
CEW 
& AAP-6
Battle damage 
assessment (BDA)
The assessment of effects resulting from the application 
of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a 
military objective.
AAP-6
Bi-propellant A liquid propellant in the form of two substances, 
a fuel and an oxidizer; they are stored separately and 
brought together when their mutual chemical reaction 
is required to produce thrust.
JSP 482
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TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Blast A destructive wave of gases or air produced in the 
surrounding atmosphere by a detonation. The blast 
includes a shock front, high pressure behind the shock 
front and a rarefaction following the high pressure.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Blind A prepared explosive store, which though initiated, 
has failed to arm as intended or to explode after being 
armed; failing to function correctly after initiation, 
becoming unexploded ordnance (UXO).
JSP 482 
Mod.
Bomb Explosive munition, not subject to centrifugal forces 
and with a nearly vertical angle of descent, usually 
delivered from an aircraft or mortar.
IATG
Brisance The shattering effect of an explosive or explosion. IATG
Calibre The calibre designation of a munition reflects the nominal 
projectile diameter, which is most often determined 
based on the bore of a weapon, as measured across 
the features of the weapon’s rifling.
The calibre can be determined from the diameter 
of the lands (X), the diameter of the grooves (Y), 
or the average diameter of both (X+Y divided by 2); 
alternatively, it can correspond with an arbitrary 
figure, which is provided by the cartridge or weapon 
designer. Some calibres (typically those using 
imperial measurements) are commonly measured 
between the grooves, instead of being based on the 
diameter of the lands of the barrel’s rifling, although 
this is not always the case. In smoothbore weapons, 
the calibre may be determined by measuring 
the diameter of the projectile, the barrel or may 
be an arbitrary measurement. The term ‘calibre’ 
is sometimes applied to measurements of munitions 
other than projectiles, such as rockets and missiles. 
In these cases, it is generally equivalent to the outer 
diameter of the body at its widest or average point.
ARES
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TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
City, Town, 
Village, Hamlet
A human settlement with a name, built-up area and 
an established community. The categorisation in terms 
depends on the size and density of the population as 
well as sum of housing and economic infrastructure, 
and varies from region to region. More specifically:
• City is a large town; an inhabited place with greater 
size, population, administration or importance than 
a town.
• Town has defined boundaries and local governance, 
and is larger than a village and generally smaller than 
a city, with its own business or shopping area.
• Village is a group of houses and associated buildings, 
generally larger than a hamlet and smaller than 
a town, situated in a rural area.
• Hamlet is a small settlement, generally smaller than 
a village and without a place of worship.
CEW
Cluster munitions Containers designed to disperse or release multiple 
submunitions. Note: generally only applied to weapons 
dispersing explosive submunitions.
IATG
Collateral damage Inadvertent casualties and destruction in civilian areas 
caused by military operations.
AAP-6
Concentration 
of civilians
Any concentration of civilians be it permanent or 
temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, 
or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns 
of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads.
CCW 
Protocol III
Conventional 
munitions
Munitions, which are neither nuclear, biological 
nor chemical.
AAP-6 
Mod.
Conventional 
weapon
A weapon, which is neither nuclear, biological nor 
chemical.
AAP-6
Debris Any portion of the natural ground or of a structure 
or material (not part of the functioning explosive 
weapon) that is propelled from the site of an explosion. 
Also known as projections.
JSP 482
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TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Deflagration A rapid chemical reaction in which the output of heat 
is sufficient to enable the reaction to proceed and 
be accelerated without input of heat from another 
source. Deflagration is a surface phenomenon with the 
reaction products flowing away from the unreacted 
material to the surface at subsonic velocity. The effect 
of a deflagration under confinement is an explosion. 
Confinement of the reaction increases the pressure rate 
of reaction and temperature and may cause transition 
into a detonation.
JSP 482
Demilitarisation The complete range of processes that render weapons, 
ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally 
intended purpose.
IATG
Detonation An exothermic reaction wave, which follows and also 
maintains, a supersonic shock front in an explosive.
JSP 482
Detonator A device containing a sensitive explosive intended 
to produce a detonation wave.
JSP 482
En masse In a mass, all together, as a group: several weapons 
firing a number of munitions as a single group,  
near-simultaneously.
CEW
Explosion A nuclear, chemical or physical process leading to the 
sudden release of energy (and usually gases and heat) 
giving rise to external pressure waves.
JSP 482
Explosive Solid or liquid substance or mixture of substances, 
which by intrinsic chemical reaction is capable 
of producing an explosion. A substance or mixture 
of substances, which, under external influences, 
is capable of rapidly releasing energy in the form 
of gases and heat.
IATG
Explosive charge A bagged, wrapped or cased quantity of explosives 
without its own integral means of ignition. Secondary 
means of ignition may or may not be incorporated.
IATG
Terminology | 117
TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Explosive 
substance
A substance or mixture of substances, which are 
capable by a chemical reaction in itself of producing 
gas at such a temperature and pressure and at such 
speed as to cause damage to surroundings or which 
is designed to produce an effect by heat, light, 
sound, gas or smoke or a combination of these as a 
result of non-detonating, self-sustaining exothermic 
chemical reactions.
JSP 482
Explosive 
ordnance (EO)
All munitions containing explosives. This includes 
bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; 
artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; 
all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; 
clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant 
actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine 
and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or 
related items or components explosive in nature.
AAP-6 
Mod.
Explosive 
remnants of war 
(ERW)
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive 
ordnance (AXO) that remain after the end of an armed 
conflict, military operation, on a range etc., including all 
munitions, mines and cluster munitions.
IATG Mod.
Explosive 
weapons
Weapons and munitions that generally consist of 
a casing with a high explosive filling and whose 
destructive effects result mainly from the blast wave 
and fragmentation produced by detonation.
CEW
Explosive 
weapon primary 
effects
Destructive effects radiating from the point of initiation 
of detonating ordnance and include blast overpressure, 
fragmentation, heat and light.
CEW
Explosive weapon 
secondary effects
Destructive, immediate additional effects to the primary 
explosive weapon effects due to the interaction with 
structures and substances present in built and natural 
environments. Examples are secondary fragmentation 
generated by blast or primary fragmentation, fires 
caused by thermal output, the generation of toxic gases 
and hazardous chemicals, smoke, debris, etc.
CEW
118 | Terminology
TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Explosive 
weapon tertiary 
effects
Indirect increase in the pattern of harm from the primary 
and secondary effects, manifesting in reduced safety 
and security, lack of health services, lost livelihoods, 
poor nutrition and hygiene, weakened governance and 
social services and rise of socio-economic problems. 
Examples are lack of food and water supply, dysfunction 
of sewage system and telephone lines, inability to 
access medical care and schooling, loss of livelihoods 
and unemployment, lack of basic security and other 
detrimental consequences on everyday activity. 
Interchangeable with Reverberating effects.
CEW
Explosive 
weapons 
in populated 
areas (EWIPA)
Refers to the use of an explosive weapon (primarily 
ones capable of wide area effects) in a hamlet, village, 
town or city where there are civilians and civilian 
infrastructure within the range of its primary and/or 
secondary effects.
CEW
Fragment Any solid material in contact with an explosive or 
surrounding it closely that is propelled from the site of 
an explosion and often splintered. It is mainly applied 
to the ordnance metal casing and other non-explosive 
components. Note: secondary fragments may be glass, 
concrete, metal, wood, etc. from the environment 
affected by blast and primary fragmentation.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Fuse In munitions and explosive terms: a simple burning 
fuse, e.g. safety fuse, fuse instantaneous.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Fuze A device designed to control the initiation of a main 
(explosive) charge.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Grenade Munition that is designed to be thrown by hand or to 
be launched from a rifle. Excludes rocket-propelled 
grenades (c.f. Rocket).
IATG
Guided missile 
(GM)
Guided missiles consist of propellant-type motors fitted 
with warheads containing high explosive or other active 
agent and equipped with electronic guidance devices.
IATG
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TERM DESCRIPTION (FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARACTERISATION) SOURCE
Harm Physical injury, death or damaging effects to the health 
of people, or damage to property or the environment.
IATG
Hazard Potential source of harm. IATG
Heavy explosive 
weapon
Artillery weapon system (field gun, howitzer, cannon, 
mortar, rocket launcher), air-delivered bomb, a missile 
or a tank gun, which has a calibre of 100 mm and above 
and munition with explosive payload.
CEW
High explosive 
(HE)
A substance or mixture of substances, which in their 
application as primary, booster or main charge in 
ammunition is required to detonate.
JSP 482
High velocity 
projections
Debris or fragments at high velocity as the result of 
an explosion and that may have sufficient remaining 
energy to propagate the explosion of another source 
capable of explosion or deflagration.
CEW
Hospitals, 
schools etc.
Vulnerable buildings, facilities or groups of these where 
people are normally present in large numbers.
CEW
Hypergolic Capable of spontaneous ignition on contact with 
another specific substance.
JSP 482
Hypergolic 
propellant
A self-igniting bi-propellant in which fuel and oxidizer 
ignite on contact with each other.
JSP 482
Hypergolic 
reaction
The spontaneous ignition of two components, 
particularly relevant in the case of liquid bi-propellants.
IATG
Incendiary 
munition
A munition containing an incendiary substance, which 
may be a solid, liquid or gel; this includes white and red 
phosphorus, thermite, jellied fuel mixture, etc.
IATG Mod.
Inert A munition that contains no explosive, pyrotechnic, 
lachrymatory, radioactive, chemical, biological or other 
toxic components or substances. This term is also used 
for the empty body of an item before being filled, or a 
rendered safe item.
IATG Mod.
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Inert filling A non-explosive filling used to replace explosives and 
enable operational items to be simulated for training 
and testing, and increasingly for operational purposes.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Inhabited area An area where people live, visit or work. CEW
Inhabited building A building or structure occupied in whole or in part by 
people. Used synonymously with occupied building.
JSP 482
Inhabited place Any place (area) where people are present. CEW
Lachrymatory 
ammunition
Ammunition containing chemical compounds that 
are designed to temporarily incapacitate by causing 
tears or inflammation of the eyes.
IATG
Light explosive 
weapon
Any man-portable weapon designed for use by two 
or three persons serving as a crew (although some 
may be carried and used by a single person) that is 
designed to expel or launch a projectile by the action of 
an explosive charge and uses high explosive munitions. 
Includes hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade 
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns and missile 
systems, portable anti-tank guns and rocket and missile 
systems, recoilless rifles and mortars of a calibre of less 
than 100 mm, as well as their parts, components and 
high explosive munitions.
IATG Mod.
Liquid propellant Any liquid that can be used for the chemical 
generation of gas at controlled rates and used for 
propulsion purposes.
JSP 482
Low order 
detonation
An incomplete and relatively slow detonation, being 
more nearly combustion than an explosion.
IATG
Market place A dedicated area, normally in or near a settlement, 
where stalls or shops are erected on at least one day 
per week and people can exchange or buy goods or 
services.
CEW
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Medical/first aid 
centre
A place where people can go for assistance if they 
are wounded or ill. Can be anything from a marked 
out area with no structure, to a large hospital.
CEW
Meeting place A geographically defined place where groups of 
people regularly meet, often for a common purpose 
or to assemble prior to travelling to another place.
CEW
Mine In land mine warfare, an explosive munition 
designed to be placed under, on or near the ground 
or other surface area and to be actuated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person, land 
vehicle, aircraft or boat, including landing craft.
AAP-6
Missile An armament store designed to be released from 
an aircraft or discharged from a gun or launcher 
towards a selected point usually to cause damage at 
that point. Note: the term is often used synonymously 
with guided missile.
IATG
Mortar Generally a smoothbore, muzzle-loading, indirect 
fire gun firing relatively low velocity munitions. 
Conventional mortars do not have recoil 
mechanisms, with the main recoil force being 
transmitted directly to the ground via the baseplate. 
Most mortars are restricted in elevation, and are 
only capable of firing at high-angle trajectories 
(above 45°), preventing use in the direct fire 
support role.
ARES
Multi barrel 
rocket launcher 
(MBRL)
A rocket launching system with more than one 
barrel, arranged so as to be able to fire in relatively 
quick succession, without the need to reload. Most 
commonly fitted to a self-propelled vehicle or a 
towed trailer. Sometimes referred to as a ‘multiple 
launch rocket system’ (MLRS), however this is the 
name of a specific U.S.-made weapon system.
ARES
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Munition A complete device, (e.g. missile, shell, mine, demolition 
store etc.) charged with explosives, propellants, 
pyrotechnics, initiating compositions or nuclear, 
biological or chemical material, for use in connection 
with offence, or defence, or training, or non-operational 
purposes, including those parts of weapon systems 
containing explosives. Synonymous with Ammunition. 
Note: term ‘ammunition’ includes; shells, bullets, fuses 
and powder; whereas ‘munition’ carries a broader 
reference to, artillery guns, missiles, and bombs. 
‘Munitions’ (plural) can be ‘weapons used in combat’.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Nature 
(when related 
to ammunition)
The specific types of ammunition. A means of catego-
rising ammunition or munitions by their function 
(e.g. anti-tank ammunition or riot control ammunition).
IATG
Neutralize To alter the state of a piece of ammunition or munition 
so that it cannot explode, e.g. by replacing safety 
devices such as pins or rods into an explosive item 
to prevent the fuze or igniter from functioning, or by 
disrupting the explosive train.
IATG
Net explosive 
quantity (NEQ)
The total explosives content present in a container, 
ammunition, building etc., unless it has been determined 
that the effective quantity is significantly different from 
the actual quantity. It does not include such substances 
as white phosphorus, war gas or smoke and incendiary 
compositions unless these substances contribute  
significantly to the dominant hazard of the Hazard 
Division concerned. Also known as Net Explosive 
Content (NEC), Net Explosive Mass (NEM) or 
Net Explosive Weight (NEW). Can also be referred 
to as Equivalent Net Explosive Quantity (ENEQ), 
where TNT equivalence is used.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Overpressure The pressure above atmospheric pressure resulting 
from the blast wave of an explosion. It is referred 
to as ‘positive’ when it exceeds atmospheric pressure 
and ‘negative’ when during the passage of the wave 
the resulting pressures are less than the atmospheric 
pressure.
JSP 482 
Mod.
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Performance 
failure
The failure of ammunition or any of its constituent parts, 
including the explosives, to function as designed.
IATG
Phosphorus A flare/smoke-producing incendiary composition, 
or smoke-screening agent, made from a common 
allotrope of the chemical element phosphorus.
IATG
Place of worship A specially designed structure or consecrated space 
where individuals or groups of people perform 
religious acts.
CEW
Populated area Area likely to contain concentrations of civilians. 
The term ’concentrations of civilians‘ is defined in 
Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons as any concentration of civilians, be it 
permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of 
cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or 
columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads. 
Note: populated areas are not synonymous with ‘urban’.
CCW
Population 
density
The number of human inhabitants of an area per square 
kilometre (km2).
CEW
Precautionary 
measures
Precautions in attack (art 57): verify that targets are 
military objectives and not subject to special protection; 
choose means and methods of warfare to avoid and 
minimise loss of civilian life and injury and damage to 
civilian objects; refrain from launching a disproportionate 
attack; cancel or suspend an attack if the target is not a 
military objective or subject to special protection; provide 
effective advance warnings whenever possible; and 
choose the military objective expected to cause least 
danger to civilians and civilian objects.
Precautions against the effects of attack (Art 58): seek 
to remove the civilians and civilian objects from the 
vicinity of military objectives; avoid locating weapons, 
troops or other military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas; and take other precautions to 
protect the civilians and civilian objects against dangers 
resulting from military operations.
ICRC API 
Art. 57-58 
Mod.
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Preventive 
measures
Measures taken in advance to prevent the 
occurrence of collateral damage or to mitigate 
their effects.
CEW
Primary explosive An explosive substance, which is sensitive to 
spark, friction, impact or flame, and is capable of 
promoting initiation in an unconfined state. 
Generally, primary explosives are synonymous with 
initiating explosives.
JSP 482
Proliferation The increase or spread of weapons and ammunition 
to users.
IATG
Proof The functional testing and assessment of an explosive 
to ascertain its performance.
JSP 482
Propellant A substance on its own or in a mixture with other 
substances that can be used for the chemical 
generation of gases at the controlled rates required 
for propulsive purposes.
JSP 482
Propellant 
stabiliser
A substance added to single or double base propellants 
to retard decomposition.
IATG
Protective 
measures
Means used to reduce risk. IATG
Pyrophoric A substance capable of spontaneous ignition when 
exposed to air, such as white phosphorous.
IATG
Pyrotechnic A substance or mixture of substances which, when 
ignited, undergo an energetic chemical reaction at a 
controlled rate intended to produce effects such as 
light, smoke, sound or flame.
JSP 482
Recreation area A designated area for recreational use. CEW
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Reverberating 
effects
Reverberating Effects of Explosive Force (REEF) 
is interchangeable with Tertiary Explosive Weapon 
Effects.
CEW
Risk Combination of the probability of occurrence of 
harm and the severity of that harm.
IATG
Risk analysis Systematic use of available information to identify 
hazards and to estimate the risk.
IATG
Rocket A missile whose motion is due to reaction propulsion 
and whose flight path cannot be controlled during 
flight.
JSP 482
Rocket motor Article consisting of a solid or liquid fuel contained in 
a cylinder fitted with one or more nozzles. They are 
designed to propel a rocket or a guided missile.
IATG
Round A complete assembly of a projectile (with or without 
fuze), the propelling charge in a cartridge case and 
the means of igniting the propelling charge.
JSP 482 
Mod.
Salvo For the purposes of CEW, salvo refers to an explosive 
weapon attack of between 2 and 9 projectiles of the 
same type in one (target) area by at least two weapons 
(one round each).
CEW
Safe The absence of risk. Normally the term ‘tolerable risk’ 
is more appropriate and accurate.
IATG
Safety The reduction of risk to a tolerable level. The degree 
of freedom from unacceptable risk.
IATG
Secondary 
fragmentation
Fragmentation, which in an explosive event, did not 
originate from the munition.
IATG Mod.
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Small arms 
ammunition (SAA)
Ammunition fired from weapons not above 
14.5 mm in calibre.
CEW
Smoke 
ammunition
Ammunition containing a smoke-producing 
substance.
IATG
Spalling Spalling occurs by the transmission of a shock wave 
through material that creates high-speed particles 
from the opposite face of that material without 
breaching it.
JSP 482
Standing 
operating 
procedures (SOPs)
Instructions that define the preferred or currently 
established method of conducting an operational task 
or activity. Their purpose is to promote recognisable 
and measurable degrees of discipline, uniformity, 
consistency and commonality within an organisation, 
with the aim of improving operational effectiveness 
and safety. SOPs should reflect local requirements 
and circumstances.
IATG
Submunition Any munition that, to perform its tasks, separates 
from a parent munition (e.g. cluster munitions).
IATG
Supply centre A location where natural resources, raw materials, 
components and finished products are gathered 
prior to being distributed to customer outlets or 
customers.
CEW
Supply chain A system of organisations, people, activities, 
information and resources involved in moving a product 
or service from producer to customer.
CEW
Tank gun A gun fitted to a battle tank as its primary armament. 
In modern usage, typically of 75 mm to 155 mm in 
calibre, featuring an advanced stabilisation system 
and capable of firing a variety of different munitions. 
Often, but not always, fitted with an autoloader.
ARES
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Target The object of a particular action, for example a 
geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, 
equipment, an individual, a group or system 
planned for capture, exploitation, neutralization 
or destruction by military forces.
AAP-6
Target area The target plus the surrounding area within 
range of a weapon’s primary and secondary 
explosive effects.
CEW
Targeting The process of selecting and prioritising targets 
and matching the appropriate response to them, 
taking into account operational requirements 
and capabilities.
AAP-6
Tolerable risk Risk, which is accepted in a given context based on 
the current values of society.
IATG
Town A town is a human settlement generally larger than 
a village but smaller than a city. What constitutes a 
town varies considerably in parts of the world and is 
mainly dictated by the population density, occupied 
geographical area and economical functions 
within, as well as administrative importance to the 
host state. A town has defined boundaries and local 
governance, with its own business or shopping area. 
Refer to City, Town, Village, Hamlet.
CEW
Transport hub A transport hub (also interchange) is a place where 
passengers and cargo are exchanged between 
vehicles or between transport modes. Public 
transport hubs include train stations, rapid transit 
stations, bus and tram stops, airports and ferry 
terminals.
CEW
Type A division of ammunition in accordance with its 
general design, e.g. AP, SAP, Nose Ejection.
JSP 482
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Unexploded 
ordnance (UXO)
EO that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise 
prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, 
dropped, launched or projected yet remains 
unexploded either through malfunction or design 
or for any other reason.
IMAS
Village Human settlement. Usually small and consisting 
of a few dwellings and only the most basic of 
infrastructures. In a more populated region can refer 
to a settlement of up to 5000 people and have basic 
necessities i.e. shops, church, meeting place etc. 
Refer to City, Town, Village, Hamlet.
CEW
Vulnerable 
building
Building deemed to be vulnerable by nature of its 
construction or function.
JSP 482
Warhead That portion of a missile intended to be lethal or 
incapacitating.
JSP 482
Weapon Anything used, designed or intended for use in causing 
death or injury, or for the purposes of threatening or 
intimidating any person.
IATG
Weapon with 
wide area effects
An explosive weapon capable of producing 
primary and secondary effects well beyond the 
point of initiation, including by means of the large 
destructive radius of the individual munition(s) used, 
inaccuracy of the delivery system or munition, 
the use of multiple munitions, or a combination 
of these factors.
CEW
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Key to term sources
ARES Terms established by Armament Research Services.
AAP-6 NATO Glossary of terms and definitions: Allied Administrative Publication No. 6.
CCW Terms recorded in the text of the Convention for Certain Conventional 
Weapons and appearing in the Protocols I, II and IV and Amended  
Protocols III and V.
CEW Terms established by GICHD wherein no suitable description for the EWIPA 
context could be found in recognised publications on explosive weapons 
and munitions.
IATG International Ammunition Technical Guidelines; UN publication controlled 
by UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.
ICRC Terms recorded in the text of Geneva Conventions and appearing in the 
Protocols, maintained by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
IMAS International Mine Action Standards. UN publication controlled by UN Mine 
Action Service and maintained by GICHD.
JSP 482 Joint Service Publication No. 482: British Forces Joint Service ammunition 
authority.
Mod. Modified description based on an existing definition, altered from the 
original to a small extent (i.e. condensed), or combined from several similar 
definitions, for the purposes of characterisation activity.
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